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Efficient Enforcement in International Law
Anu Bradford and Omri Ben-Shahar*
Abstract
Enforcement is a fundamental challenge for international law. Sanctions are costly to
impose, difficult to coordinate, and often ineffective at accomplishing their goals. Rewards are
likewise costly and domestically unpopular. Thus, eforts to address pressing international
problems-such as reversing climate change and coordinating moneta ypoli y-oftenfall short.
This Article offers a novel approach to international enforcement and demonstrates the
advantages of such an approach over traditional sanctions or rewards. It develops a mechanism
of Reversible Rewards, which combines sticks and carrots in a unique, previously unexplored
way. Reversible Rewards require that a sum of money be offered as a reward to the Target for
its compliance (Incentive 1). Alternativey, the same amount of money can be used to pay for
sanctions in case the Target turns down the reward (Incentive 2). This way, the money
earmarked for the enforcement effort "works twice" and thus doubles the Target's incentives to
comply. Moreover, Reversible Rewards can be pre-committed in an enforcement fund to solve the
problem of credibility. The Article demonstrates that, relative to sanctions or rewards used
alone, Reversible Rewards reduce the costs of international enforcement and increase compliance
with international rules.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic sanctions form a core strategy of the US' foreign relations.' In
the recent past, the US government imposed economic sanctions against Iraq,
Iran, North Korea, and Libya in efforts to halt their development of nuclear
weapons, and against South Africa to discourage its practice of apartheid. The
use of sanctions is also repeatedly proposed against China-whether to force it
to further open its markets to foreign trade and investment, protect intellectual
See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, et a], US Economic Sanctions:- Their Impact on Trade, jobs, and Wages
(Peterson Inst Intl Econ Working Paper, Apr 1997), online at
http://www.piie.com/publications/wp/print.cfm?researchid149&docpub (visited Oct 18,
2011) (describing economic sanctions as a "weapon of choice to enforce a myriad of US foreign
policy goals" and a "fixture of US foreign policy at least since President Carter").
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property rights, forgo currency interventions, respect human rights, or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.2
Despite their frequent use, sanctions are controversial, costly, and usually
ineffective.' Obviously, sanctions must entail economic and political costs to the
state on which they are imposed (Target). The problem is that sanctions are also
costly to the state imposing them (Sender).' Take trade embargos, for example.
By preventing domestic firms from trading with the Target, embargos both hurt
exporters and curtail the flow of cheap imports.s These costs dilute domestic
support for sanctions and, consequently, often deter a government from
pursuing them in the first place. Humanitarian costs associated with economic
embargos further diminish public support for the sanctioning regime.
Alternatively, the Sender may try to influence the Target's behavior
through rewards. But such rewards are also costly and often hard to justify to
domestic constituents. They are also difficult to coordinate in the international
arena where other beneficiary states have an incentive to free ride on the reward
effort.
The challenge, then, is to devise incentive schemes that would have the
maximum effect on the behavior of the Target at an economically and politically
feasible cost to the Sender. This Article develops such a new enforcement
method-"Reversible Rewards." It offers a solution to two problems that
undermine existing efforts to enforce international law: high costs and low credibility
associated with both a threat of sanctions and a promise of rewards. Under the
conditions that we specify, Reversible Rewards can be both more effective and
less costly than any enforcement mechanism based on either sanctions or
rewards alone.
2 See, for example, Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011, S 1619, 112th Cong,
1st Sess (Sept 22, 2011), in 157 Cong Rec S 6378 (Oct 11, 2011); American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009, HR 2454 §5 765-69, 111th Cong, 1st Sess (May 15, 2009); Adrian U-Jin Ang
and Dursun Peksen, When Do Economic Sanctions Work?: Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, and
Outcomes, 60 Pol Rsrch Q 135, 135-36 (2007); Wayne M. Morrison, The China-U.S. Intellectual
Propery Rights Dispute: Background and Implications for China-U.S. Economic Relations, Cong Rsrch Serv
Report 94-469 E **1-3 (May 24, 1996).
3 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft 57(Princeton 1985) (noting that "[i]t would be difficult to
find any proposition in the international relations literature more widely accepted than those
belittling the utility of economic techniques of statecraft").
4 See Hufbauer, et al, US Economic Sanctions (cited in note 1).
5 See Joanmarie M. Dowling and Mark P. Popiel, War by Sanctions: Are We Targeting Ourselves?, 11
Currents: Intl Trade L J 8, 9 & n 25(Winter 2002), citing Jeong Hwa Pires, North Korean Time
Bomb: Can Sanctions Defuse It? A Review of International Economic Sanctions as an Option, 24 Ga J Intl &
Comp L 307, 335-36 (1994) (explaining that one of the primary reasons sanctions fail is that they
are often more costly to the sender nations than to the target).
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Reversible Rewards combine both sanctions and rewards in the following
way: a sum of money is offered to the Target as a reward for its compliance. If
the Target turns down the reward and continues its violations, the same amount
of money is used for the second purpose: to reimburse the Sender for the cost
of levying sanctions on the Target. That is, the money that was initially
earmarked to reward the Target is now reversed to reward the Sender for
punishing the Target.
To illustrate this effect, consider the following simplified scenario. State A
wants to stop an objectionable behavior (for example, pollution) by its neighbor,
State B. This behavior conveys a benefit of $1000 to State B and a harm of
$1000 to State A. State A can retaliate, but it would cost $1000 to coerce State B
to cease the behavior. State A can also offer a reward to State B to stop
polluting, but it would, again, cost $1000 to induce State B to agree. Under our
proposed Reversible Reward scheme, State A does not need to spend the full
$1000. Half-$500-would be enough. State A needs to offer $500 to State B as
a reward for its compliance. If State B declines the reward, the same $500 would
be used to finance State A's retaliation against State B. Although the retaliatory
sanction is only half the full sanction necessary to stop the disruption, this
scheme would nevertheless succeed. The choices that the State B faces-
continue versus cease pollution-present a difference of $1000, exactly enough
to lure State B to comply. To put it differently, State B's payoff of $500 from
non-compliance (consisting of the benefit of polluting minus the half-sanction)
does not exceed its payoff of $500 from compliance (consisting of a reward).
Here, at a cost of $500-half the amount necessary for an effective sanction or
effective reward-State A induces the desired change in State B's conduct.
The primary advantage of Reversible Rewards lies in their "double effect":
any amount of money earmarked for the purpose of enforcement "works twice"
and thus furnishes double the incentive to comply. The Target's failure to
comply would cost it not only the forgone reward but also the ensuing sanction.
As the Target faces the prospect of losing twice, the deterrent effect of
enforcement funds is doubled relative to the same money used for a simple
sanction or a simple reward. As a result, this dual use of the funds substantially
reduces the Sender's costs of deterring the Target.
To commit credibly to this dual enforcement scheme, the Sender may
deposit the Reversible Reward into an irrevocable fund. The Sender would
stipulate that the funds can only be used for either rewarding or sanctioning the
Target and not be recouped otherwise. The upfront sinking of the enforcement
funds makes the marginal cost of subsequently carrying out the enforcement
effort zero, lending credibility both to the Sender's promise of rewards and to its
simultaneous threat of sanctions.
The two features of the Reversible Rewards scheme-the double effect
and the precommitment effect-can be combined or uncoupled. For example,
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the double effect can be accomplished without a precommitment. Indeed, in
many areas of the law incentives are sometimes created by the dual use of sticks
and carrots. If an employee excels, she is promoted, whereas if she fails to
perform, she is demoted. A firm that sells a valuable product earns a nice profit,
whereas a firm that sells a defective product is liable in tort. In international law,
rewards and sanctions are traditionally used as alternatives, without taking
advantage of the double effect that their combined use would generate. We
show how the dual use of rewards and sanctions through Reversible Rewards
can lower the Sender's enforcement costs and generate compliance in situations
where simple sanctions or simple rewards would fail.
Similarly, the precommitment effect does not need to be tied to Reversible
Rewards but could simply be used to lend credibility to sanctions and rewards.
Building prisons is a way to precommit sanctioning costs; depositing funds into
trust accounts is a way to precommit rewards. In international law, leveraging
the precommitment device is not as common as it is in private and commercial
law. This Article discusses ways in which precommitment contracts could
become a more common tool of international enforcement, mitigating the
concern that international enforcement suffers from lack of credibility.
We use a simple framework to demonstrate the advantage of Reversible
Rewards over simple sanctions or simple rewards. We specify when and why
Reversible Rewards are cheaper instruments to generate compliance. However,
we also recognize that the practical application of this mechanism is limited.
Simple sanctions always dominate Reversible Rewards when a threat of
sanctions is credible and thus need not be carried out. Simple sanctions are also
often superior to Reversible Rewards when the Sender has to deter numerous
Targets engaged in an identical violation. Accordingly, we conclude that
Reversible Rewards are better suited to deter unique violations by specific
Targets as opposed to systematic and generic violations by multiple Targets.
We then examine settings in which Reversible Rewards can be
implemented to enhance compliance with international law. We expect Senders
to utilize Reversible Rewards against selected Targets that are least likely to be
deterred with simple sanctions. The first application focuses on the ongoing
conflict between the US and China pertaining to China's exchange rate policy.
We use it to capture a bilateral scenario in which both sanctions and rewards are
available but-if used alone-are too costly for the Sender to implement. The
second application explores the reach of Reversible Rewards to a multilateral
cooperation problem such as climate change, where a group of states seeks to
overcome a collective action problem and induce free riders to comply with
emissions targets. In both cases, we show that the Sender (or a coalition of
Senders) is able to induce compliance at a substantially lower cost than
conventional enforcement mechanisms would suggest.
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Section I discusses the limitations of traditional sanctions and rewards,
focusing on the costs they impose on the Sender. Section II demonstrates how
Reversible Rewards can lower these enforcement costs. Section III illustrates the
benefits of Reversible Rewards through applications. The Conclusion discusses
the broader possibilities and limits of Reversible Rewards to enhance compliance
with international law.
II. COSTLY ENFORCEMENT
This Section explains when and why states resort to sanctions and,
conversely, when and why they use rewards to persuade other states to modify
their behavior. It also discusses the various costs involved in both enforcement
strategies, exposing the key shortcomings that these traditional tools of
economic coercion and inducement impose on credible enforcement of
international law.
A. The Prevalence of Sanctions and Rewards
1. Sanctions.
The US has resorted to economic sanctions more frequently than any other
country in the world.6 Alternatives, ranging from diplomacy to military action,
are either less effective or too risky and controversial.' In 1919, President
Woodrow Wilson set the tone that would subsequently be followed by
numerous American leaders:
A nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this
economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for
force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation
boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment,
no modern nation could resist.
Traditionally, the perception has been that economic sanctions are a cheap and
easy option relative to the potential use of military force, because they do not
6 See Gary Hufbauer, The Snake Oil of Dolomag; When Tensions Rise, the U.S. Peddles Sanctions, Wash
Post C01 (July 12, 1998). See also Gary Clyde Hufbauer, et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 9-41
(Peterson Inst Intl Econ 3d ed 2009); sources cited in Richard D. Farmer, Costs of Economic
Sanctions to the Sender, 23 World Econ 93, 95-96 (2000).
7 See Hufbauer, Snake Oil of Diplomaq (cited in note 6) (noting that the American affinity for
sanctions has been influenced by the perception that military force is too costly and diplomacy
too feeble to address the problem of global misdeeds). See also Richard N. Haass and Meghan L.
O'Sullivan, Introduction, in Richard N. Haass and Megan L. O'Sullivan, eds, Hone and Vinegar:
Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Pol.g 1, 2 (Brookings 2000) (noting that "[a]lthough military action
will remain an essential foreign policy tool, its application is expensive and by no means certain of
achieving its goals").
8 See Hufbauer, et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered at I n 1 (cited in note 6).
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involve direct government spending nor do they require the President to send
troops into combat.' Thus, they form a "middle path between violence and
talk." 0
Sanctions were a major tool used by the US for conducting international
relations during the Cold War." While most Cold War sanctions have been
repealed, the 1962 sanctions against Cuba remain in force today.12 Currently, the
US has sixty-nine laws authorizing economic sanctions against twenty
countries."
Economic sanctions take many forms. They consist of trade sanctions (that
is, export and import restrictions), financial sanctions (withdrawal of credit or
financial assistance to the Target), or asset sanctions (freezing of assets that Target
holds in the Sender country). Sanctions can be unilateral (for example, imposed
by the US alone) or multilateral (for example, authorized by the UN or imposed
by a "coalition of the willing"). While in the past sanctions were primarily
inflicted for national security purposes, states have more recently resorted to
sanctions to address a broader set of policy issues, including drug trafficking,
human rights, and the environment. 4
Expansive use of economic sanctions responds to the lack of effective
third-party enforcement of international law and the resulting endemic problem
of compliance with international rules. International norms relating to nuclear
non-proliferation, terrorism, human rights, currency manipulation, or climate
change are often underdeveloped, imprecise, or ineffective. There is no
supranational authority to force states to sign onto international treaties. And
9 See Richard B. Cheney, Defending Lbery in a Global Economy, in Solveig Singleton and Daniel T.
Griswold, eds, Economic Casualties: How U.S. Foreign Poliy Undermines Trade, Growth, and Liberty 19,
24 (Cato Inst 1999).
10 Richard W. Parker, The Problem with Scorecards: How (and How Not) to Measure the Cost-Effectiveness of
Economic Sanctions, 21 Mich J Intl L 235, 236 (2000).
11 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls forPoiticalEnds. Four Perspectives, 4 Chi J Intl L 355, 357-
60 (2003) (discussing the use of export controls by the US as a method of gaining leverage over
Soviet satellite states).
12 See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR 5§ 515.101-515.901. See also Presidential
Memorandum, Continuation of Authorities under the Trading with the Enemy Act (Sept 2,2010),
online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/02/presidential-memorandum-
continuation-authorities-under-trading-with-enem (visited Oct 18, 2011) (extending sanctions
against Cuba found in 31 CFR 5 515 for one year).
13 See US Department of the Treasury, Sanctions Programs and CountU Information (Oct 13, 2011),
online at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx
(visited Sept 26, 2011).
14 See Cong Budget Office, The Domestic Costs of Sanctions on Foreign Commerce *4 (Mar 1999), online at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/llxx/docll33/tradesanc.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2011) (CBO
Report). See also Hufbauer, Snake Oil of Diplomag, Wash Post at C01 (cited in note 6).
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even if states did sign onto such treaties, there is no international enforcement
body that would enforce those treaties when states breach them. Thus, coercion
through economic sanctions has become a common tool for conducting foreign
affairs and enforcing international norms.
2. Rewards.
As an alternative to sanctions, or "sticks," the Sender can employ rewards,
or "carrots." Rewards are commonly used as side payments to forge
international cooperation." China received financial assistance as a side payment
for its participation in the Montreal Protocol that regulates emissions of ozone-
depleting substances." China also benefited from significant trade and
technology benefits in the 1970s and 1980s in return for improved strategic
cooperation with the US. 7 In the past, the US has rewarded North Korea for its
promise to dismantle its nuclear reactors and allow International Atomic Energy
Agency inspectors access to its facilities. These rewards consisted of lifting
existing trade barriers, providing supplies of fuel oil, and building light-water
nuclear reactors." The US similarly pledged billions of dollars in aid to Egypt
and Israel in return for their signing a peace treaty.'
Rewards are also commonly used to buy votes in international
organizations. In 1961, the US agreed to pay Haiti for the construction of its
airport facilities in return for securing Haiti's vote to expel Cuba from the
Organization of American States.20 In the 1980s, the US offered aid to Argentina
and Chile in an aid-for-vote deal to deny Nicaragua's access to credit from the
Inter-American Development Bank. In the UN, the US has similarly bought
votes, for instance, to persuade UN Security Council members to agree to the
use of force in preparation for the Gulf War.21 Obviously, the US is not the only
15 See Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strateg of Environmental Treaty-Making 335-54
(Oxford 2003).
16 China is an Article 5 country under the Montreal Protocol, which entitles it to assistance from
developed countries under the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal
Protocol. Assistance takes the form of grants or concessional loans. See Multilateral Fund
Secretariat, Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol: Policies, Procedures, Guideines
and Critena *65 (July 2011), online at
http://www.multilateralfund.org/Our%20Work/policy/Shared%20Documents/Policy64.pdf
(visited Oct 18, 2011).
17 See William J. Long, Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation, 40 Intl Studies Q 77, 90
(1996).
18 See Daniel W. Drezner, The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflct Epectations, and Economic
Inducements, 9 Sec Studies 188, 214 (Autumn 1999).
19 See id at 188.
20 See id at 198.
21 See id at 198 & n 27.
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world power to resort to conditional rewards for political purposes. During the
Cold War, the Soviet Union frequently offered military aid and trade concessions
to buy votes in the UN. Similarly, China has offered trade deals to European
countries in an effort to persuade them not to vote against China in the UN
Human Rights Commission. 2
Rewards take many forms. They can consist of traditional development aid,
including loans, cash transfers, infrastructure investments, or debt forgiveness
programs. The Sender can also offer to reduce existing barriers to trade and
investment or transfer some technology to the Target. At times, rewards can
take the form of military aid or other security guarantees. Sometimes the most
important reward is diplomatic recognition, the granting of access to an
international institution, or the promise of cooperation in an area of importance
to the Target.23
3. Sanctions versus rewards.
In principle, rewards and sanctions should be equally effective tools to
exert influence over the Target. If State A promises State B a reward of $1000
for B's compliance or threatens B with a sanction of $1000 for its non-
compliance, then the opportunity cost of non-compliance for B is the same in
both instances.2 4
Yet there are circumstances when a Sender does not have a choice between
rewards and sanctions. At times, a Sender cannot effectively resort to sanctions.
One scenario involves a Target that is an important supplier of a product on
which the Sender depends. In 1995, Europeans refused to join the US in its
efforts to block investments in Iran's oil fields, indicating that they were running
out of fuel sources, thus making sanctions infeasible. 25 For the same reason,
Nigeria escaped sanctions that its trading partners were contemplating to inflict
for its violation of human rights; Senders were simply unable to curtail trade
with yet another oil producer. 26
Sanctions are similarly ineffective when the Target has no capacity to
comply. For example, compliance with emissions standards might require access
to clean technology, or cooperation with antiterrorism goals might require
22 See Drezner, 9 Sec Studies at 198 and n 27 (cited in note 18).
23 See Haass and O'Sullivan, Introduction at 5-6 (cited in note 7).
24 See David A. Baldwin, The Power ofPositive Sanctions, 24 World Pol 19, 20 (1971).
25 See Dianne E. Rennack and Robert D. Shuey, Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Pol6y Goals:
Discussion and Guide to Current Law *5 (Cong Rsrch Serv 1998), online at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/97-949.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2011).
26 See id.
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enforcement capacity and infrastructure that the Target may not have.2 7
Supplying necessary technology or enforcement aid may be the only way to
influence the Target's behavior. Finally, economic embargos are ineffective
when the scope of economic activity between the Sender and the Target is
limited in the first place: State A cannot deprive State B of something B does not
have. In contrast, there is no upper limit to the amount of reward that A could
extend to B.28
Conversely, sometimes the Sender is not able to resort to rewards. It is
often difficult, if not impossible, to assess what denuclearization of any given
country is worth to that country and what kinds of rewards would therefore be
appropriate to extend as a price for such a concession. Security benefits, in
particular, are often non-fungible.2 9 There may be no price that the Target is
willing to accept for forgoing existential security guarantees that a certain arsenal
of weapons offers to it. This leaves the Sender with no choice but to either
endure the Target's behavior or pursue military sanctions.
Examples of Targets turning down offers of reward are numerous. North
Vietnam refused to halt the war in Vietnam in return for President Lyndon
Johnson's offer of a substantial aid package. President Reagan was similarly
unsuccessful in persuading Iran to trade arms for hostages during the 1979-81
hostage crisis. China did not change its human rights policies in return for
President Clinton's offers of freer trade.30 And even when the Target accepts a
reward, there is no guarantee that rewards accomplish their goal of changing the
Target's incentives. The US' efforts to engage Iraq through rewards is an
example of a failed reward strategy. Iraq benefited from extensive credit
guarantees and provision of military intelligence.31 Yet the rewards only
accomplished minor changes in Iraq's policies, failed to halt Iraq's pursuit of
nuclear and chemical weapons, and did not prevent its invasion of Kuwait in
1990.32
27 See Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, Introduction andAnaicalFramework, in Thomas Bernauer
and Dieter Ruloff, eds, The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control 1, 21-22 (South Carolina
1999).
28 See Baldwin, 24 World Pol at 35 (cited in note 24).
29 See Bernauer and Ruloff, Introduction andAnalytical Framework at 31 (cited in note 27).
30 See Drezner, 9 Sec Studies at 189 (cited in note 18).
31 See Kenneth J. Juster, The United States and Iraq: Perils of Engagement, in Haass and O'Sullivan, eds,
Hone and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy 51, 53 (cited in note 7).
32 See generally Barry Rubin, The Real Roots of Arab Ani-Americanism, 81 Foreign Aff 73 (Nov/Dec
2002) (explaining that, despite decades of financial and military support for many regimes, the US
has largely failed to foster good relations with the Middle Eastern public).
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Rewarding an unsavory regime also carries the risk that the Target may
divert the resources to finance some reprehensible behavior.33 A Sender may
also fear that a reward would strengthen the Target's capabilities in future
conflicts.3 4 Rewarding rogue regimes could be particularly difficult to justify to
the domestic audience that contests the moral rationale for bribing belligerent
countries. Finally, the Target might be weary of promises for future rewards,
recognizing that the Sender would be tempted to retract its obligation once
compliance is achieved.35 For example, Iran would likely be reluctant to destroy
its nuclear infrastructure for a promise of future rewards that cannot be ex ante
secured. Thus, rewards-even if less costly than the threat of sanctions that
needs to be carried out-remain controversial, and have not, therefore, replaced
sanctions as a favorite tool of US foreign policy.
In imposing sanctions or offering rewards to the Target, the Sender seeks
to maximize its political gains and minimize its costs." Next, we explore the
various costs incurred by Sender when inflicting sanctions or offering rewards to
the Target. While we recognize the possibility of military sanctions, our
discussion focuses on economic sanctions. We also focus on economic costs
and leave aside various political costs associated with sanctions and rewards
alike.37
B. The Costs of Sanctions
The US has traditionally preferred sticks to carrots in promoting its foreign
policy goals. The reality of economic sanctions, however, shows that sanctions
have not been as effective as previously presumed.3 8 Decades of extensive
33 See Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Conclusion, in Haass and O'Sullivan, eds, Honey
and Vinegar 159, 165 (cited in note 7).
34 See Drezner, 9 Sec Studies at 201-02 (cited in note 18); Han Dorussen, Mixing Carrots with Sticks:
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives, 38 J Peace Rsrch 251, 254 (2001).
35 See Dorussen, 38 J Peace Rsrch at 257, 260 (cited in note 34).
36 See Hufbauer, et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered at 108 (cited in note 6). Empirical research also
suggests conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful. One of those
conditions is when senders avoid high costs to themselves. See Kimberly Ann Elliott, Congressional
Testimony: Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions (Peterson Inst Intl Econ Oct 23,
1997), online at
http://www.piie.com/publications/testimony/print.cfm?researchid=294&doc=pub (visited Oct
18,2011).
37 Political costs refer to the costs that failed sanctions impose on US leadership or "audience
costs"-the domestic political price a government pays for backing down after threatening Target
with sanctions. See Lisa L. Martin, Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions,
45 World Pol 406, 413 (1993).
38 See generally Robert Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 Intl Sec 90 (Autumn 1997).
See also Richard N. Haass, Sanctioning Madness, 76 Foreign Aff 74, 75-78 (Nov/Dec 1997).
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economic isolation of Cuba have not led to a regime change. North Korea has
similarly withstood economic sanctions and diplomatic exclusion to continue
development of nuclear weapons. Sanctions against Iran have been equally
discouraging-isolating Iran has not persuaded it to abandon its nuclear
program." And, importantly, while the benefits of sanctions have been elusive,
the costs have often been certain and substantial.40
Domestic corporations, workers, and consumers pay the biggest price for
the Sender's economic sanctions. In imposing sanctions, the government forces
its domestic firms to forfeit gains from trade with the Target.41 Consider, first,
the effect of export sanctions. Firms subject to export controls are deprived of
revenue when exports to or investment in the Target are prohibited or export
financing is cut off. 42 Infamous sanctioning episodes include the US' 1980-81
grain embargo against the Soviet Union (following the latter's military
occupation of Afghanistan) and the 1981-82 pipeline embargoes against Poland
and the Soviet Union (following the declaration of martial law in Poland). In the
former case, the burden imposed on the Soviet Union was quite modest-
having to pay an extra $225 million for grain from other sources-whereas the
lost exports cost the US $2.3 billion.43 In the latter case, the ban on exporting
petroleum products cost $2.2 billion to US companies and their subsidiaries."
Neither episode led to a change in the Target's behavior.45
39 See Miroslav Nincic, The Logic of Positive Engagement: Dealing with Renegade Regimes, 7 Intl Studies
Perspectives 321, 322-23 (2006).
40 See Elliott, Congressional Testimony (cited in note 36).
41 See T. Clifton Morgan and Navin A. Bapat, Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion, 5
Intl Studies Rev 65, 66-67 (Dec 2003). To ensure that firms comply with the sanctions regime,
governments often attach notable penalties on firms that continue to trade with the Target. For
instance, a firm violating the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), Pub L No 104-172,
110 Stat 1541, as amended by Pub L No 107-24, 115 Stat 199 (2001), codified at 50 USC § 1701
(2006), was subject to prosecution under the Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub L No 65-91, 40
Stat 411 (1917), codified at 50 USC App §§ 1-44 (2006), risking a $1 million fine and potential jail
time.
42 See William H. Lash III, An Overyiew of the Economic Costs of Unilateral Trade Sanctions, in Singleton
and Griswold, eds, Economic Casualies 13, 14-15 (cited in note 9) (discussing how the export sector
suffers even if government indirectly restricts exports by curtailing financing for international
trade and investment such as by restricting the ability of private institutions to offer trade
finance); CBO Report at *19 (cited in note 14).
43 See Robert O'Quinn, A User's Guide to Economic Sanctions, Backgrounder No 1126 (Heritage
Foundation 1997), online at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/BG1126.cfm (visited Oct 19, 2011).
44 See Stefanie Ann Lenway, Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Statecraft, 42 Intl
Org 397, 399 (1988).
45 See Martin, 45 World Pol at 406 (cited in note 37).
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Sanctions further increase domestic firms' long-term costs of doing
business abroad when these firms are labeled "unreliable suppliers," prompting
trading partners to diversify their sources of supply to insure against supply
disruptions.46 Short-term sanctions may also have adverse effects after they are
lifted, when Sender's firms lose subsequent sales of replacement parts,
technology, and services to Target.' Sanctions also cost US firms market share
as their foreign competitors capture their business during the time the export
embargo is in force.48 That market share may or may not be restored after trade
is later normalized. Finally, a propensity to use economic sanctions can chill
trade even before such sanctions are instituted, because clients may be
apprehensive about investing in technology sold by the Sender for fear of a
future sanctioning episode.49
It is difficult to quantify the total costs of economic sanctions to the
Sender. One frequently quoted study estimates that economic sanctions cost the
US approximately $15-$19 billion dollars annually in lost export revenue.50
These sanctions translate to the loss of 200,000 jobs in the export sector.st
These figures fail to recognize, however, that some of the exports could be
redirected to other markets, which would mitigate the losses on the export
sector. At the same time, though, these estimates exclude service exports and
investment flows that are also interrupted by sanctions.
Another category of economic sanctions consists of import restrictions.
Domestic firms using foreign inputs in their production, or consumers buying
imported goods, have to pay more when imports are restricted and alternatives
are more costly. Import sanctions might also lead to trade retaliation or, even
46 See Hufbauer, et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered at 108 (cited in note 6).
47 See Hufbauer, et al, US Economic Sanctions (cited in note 1).
48 See, for example, id (showing that foreign firms have replaced US firms in Cuba and that Canada,
Australia, and Germany export more to China than they ought to given their size, income and
geography). See also Dowling and Popiel, 11 Currents: Ind Trade L J at 12 n 100 (cited in note 5)
(recounting that when Texaco sold a 42.9 percent stake in the Burmese Yetagun oil and gas field
in late 1997, Patronas of Malaysia purchased 36.4 percent of that share).
49 See Elliott, Congressional Testimony (cited in note 36); Hufbauer, et al, US Economic Sanctions (cited in
note 1). See also Dowling and Popiel, 11 Currents: Intl Trade L J at 11 (cited in note 5)
(discussing how US sanctions have resulted in foreign companies' shifting to alternative supplies
for mechanical parts and grain).
50 See Elliott, Congressional Testimony (cited in note 36) (discussing research showing an estimate of
the costs of sanctions the US had in place in 1995 against twenty-six target countries). For a
criticism of this estimate, see generally Parker, 21 Mich J Intl L at 235 (cited in note 10). In
contrast, David Richardson, in a 1993 study, estimated that the direct loss from sanctions on
exports was $29 billion. See CBO Report at *43 (cited in note 14).
51 See Elliott, Congressional Testimony (cited in note 36); Hufbauer, et al, US Economic Sanctions (cited in
note 1).
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worse, a full-blown trade war. For instance, if the US restricts imports from
China, the US is likely to violate its obligations under the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The WTO may subsequently authorize China to retaliate
against any US industry. The prospect of a WTO challenge has led the US
historically to favor export controls over import controls.52 Export restrictions
are also likely to have a greater impact on the Target: Sender countries are often
dominant suppliers of products whose exports they are restricting (for example,
the US has often restricted the supply of military technologies where few
alternative sources of supply have been available for the Target). In contrast, the
Target can often divert its imports to alternative markets if any given Sender
restricts the Target's imports into the Sender's domestic market.
In today's economy, most economic activities depend on access to finance.
Financial sanctions and asset freeZes therefore have an effect on trade similar to that
of direct trade sanctions: they lead to contraction in trade by withholding
investment, denying access to foreign exchange or by raising the cost of (or
denying) credit.s"
The burden of economic sanctions on domestic firms has not gone
unnoticed. The US business community launched a campaign called "USA
Engage" in 1997 to highlight the costs of economic sanctions on US businesses
in an effort to change the congressional presumption in favor of sanctions to
one against them.5 4 Given the counterproductive nature of sanctions, USA
Engage has promoted alternative foreign policy tools that do not undermine
American exports, overseas investment, and competitiveness. Responding to
these concerns, the US Congress has several times sought to reform sanction
policies and require more rigorous cost-benefit analyses before a decision to
resort to sanctions is made." While most sanction-reform bills have been
unsuccessful, domestic backlash against expensive sanctions has led to the
introduction of sunset provisions on agricultural embargos and to legislation
52 See Hufbauer, et al, Economic Sancions Reconsidered at 94 (cited in note 6) (explaining that Ronald
Reagan was reluctant to exercise his authority to control imports for foreign policy reasons
because he feared that this power would later be misused for protectionist purposes).
s3 See id at 111.
54 See Parker, 21 Mich J Intl L at 237 (cited in note 10).
55 See Hufbauer, Snake Oil of Delomacy (cited in note 6) (discussing the Hamilton-Lugar Bill, a
sanctions reform bill that seeks "to establish an effective framework for consideration by the
legislative and executive branches of unilateral economic sanctions," including increased executive
branch consultation with Congress, public hearings, a cost-benefit analysis, a preference for
targeted and multilateral measures whenever possible, presidential waivers for all legislatively
imposed sanctions, and the sanctity of contracts), citing Enhancement of Trade, Security, and
Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act, S 1413, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 7 1997), in 143
Cong Rec S 11964 (Nov 7, 1997). See also Rennack and Shuey, Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S.
Foreign Polg Goals at *1 (cited in note 25).
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vesting the President with the right to waive sanctions when he or she considers
it necessary. 56
Because the cost of economic sanctions often falls disproportionately on a
limited number of individual firms and communities, the government might
agree to absorb some of these costs. Sanctions that impose costs on well-
organized interest groups such as agricultural producers or other key export
industries are particularly salient to the political process." This is why the US
compensated its farmers for the losses they incurred when participating in the
grain embargo against the Soviet Union.s8 Furthermore, the export industries
subject to sanctioning laws are often some of the most productive, sophisticated,
and competitive sectors of the economy." They are industries where current and
future gains from trade are the greatest. Restricting opportunities for these very
industries not only leads to immediate welfare losses but also impedes longer-
term economic growth.o The political process is also sensitive to the effect of
sanctions on unemployment or other labor and capital adjustments." When the
economy is booming, many displaced workers from the export sector are able to
relocate to other jobs. But these opportunities are not available during economic
downturns.
Besides the costs to firms and individuals, sanctions also entail direct
implementation costs. The US government incurs administrative costs in
monitoring and, at times, prosecuting firms that are subject to an economic
embargo. These firms often have the incentive to circumvent the embargo by
trading with the Target through offshore locations or third-country agents. 62
These costs can be even greater in instances where the US government needs to
monitor behavior taking place outside US borders.
Sanctions can be inefficient not only because of their high costs but also
because of their low success rate. A frequently cited study on the effectiveness
of sanctions argues that they are at least partially successful in only 34 percent of
cases.6 4 While some might view these numbers as encouraging, the study also
56 See Hufbauer, et al, Economic Saneions Reconsidered at 110 (cited in note 6).
57 See Farmer, 23 World Econ at 94 (cited in note 6).
5 See Martin, 45 World Pol at 414 (cited in note 37).
59 See Elliott, Congressional Testimony (cited in note 36).
60 See CBO Report at 9 (cited in note 14).
61 See Farmer, 23 World Econ at 94 (cited in note 6).
62 See Morgan and Bapat, 5 Intl Studies Rev at 66 (cited in note 41); Lenway, 42 Intl Org at 398
(cited in note 44).
63 This is the case when sanctions are extended to foreign corporations or in cases where the US
seeks to freeze assets of terrorist organizations that are spread across multiple jurisdictions.
6 See Hufbauer, et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsideredat 158 (cited in note 6).
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concludes that only one out of five sanctioning episodes leads to perceptible
changes in the Target." Further, economic sanctions have not precluded the
need to resort to military force."
In today's integrated economy, unilateral sanctions are even less likely to be
successful than they were in the past, because Targets have more opportunities
to circumvent sanctions. 7 Unilateral sanctions by a single Sender against a given
Target are rarely sufficient to change the Target's incentives to comply. If the US
refuses to buy oil from Iraq, the import ban can hardly be effective if Iraq can
divert that forgone trade to third countries." Similarly, if the US prohibits its
firms from selling anything but essential medicines to Iran, the measure is futile
if other countries continue to supply Iran with comparable products at a
comparable price." In other words, unilateral trade sanctions often only alter
trade routes and capital flows without affecting the total level of commerce.7 0
Libya provides an instructive example: when the US imposed a unilateral ban on
oil imports from Libya in 1982, the UK increased its oil imports of Libyan oil by
350 percent.7
In these instances, the Sender may seek to impose extraterritorial sanctions
by curtailing economic exchange between third countries and the Target. This
type of "secondary boycott" provision was included in the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA). 72 The ILSA targeted both US and non-US
businesses investing in Iran. The EU firmly criticized the sanctions and
65 See Hufbauer, Snake Oil ofDeplomacy (cited in note 6) (discussing South Africa as a notable success
and Haiti, Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, and China as notorious failures).
66 See, for example, Elliott, Congressional Testimony (cited in note 36) (discussing how sanctions failed
to prevent war in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Panama, and Haiti).
67 See CBO Report at *x (cited in note 14). Empirical research on the effectiveness of sanctions
points to a declining utility of the US' unilateral sanctions. While post-World War II, the US
achieved at least partial success in over 50 percent of the instances it pursued sanctions, from
1970-90, the success rate dropped to 21 percent. In the past, the success of sanctions was not tied
to the US' ability to persuade other countries to join the sanctions. In cases following the World
War II, the success rate between US' unilateral and multilateral sanctions was almost the same (29
percent and 33 percent, respectively) whereas in the 1970s and 1980s, only 13 percent of the US'
unilateral sanctions were successful. See Elliott, Congressional Tesfimony (cited in note 36).
69 See Farmer, 23 World Econ at 96, 102 (cited in note 6).
69 See Klaus Knorr, The Power ofNaions: The Poltical Economy ofInternational Relations 152 (Basic 1975)
(noting that even if Target is dependent on its trade with Sender, its government can usually turn
to other trade partners when faced with sanctions).
70 See Farmer, 23 World Econ at 102 (cited in note 6).
71 See Haass and O'Sullivan, Conclusion at 174 n 24 (cited in note 33).
72 ILSA § 4, 110 Stat at 1542-43.
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proclaimed that its companies would not comply with the ILSA." It also urged
its member states to sanction companies following the ILSA and challenged the
US' Act before the WTO. 74 A similar attempt to regulate the behavior of third
country firms was included in the Helms-Burton Act imposing an embargo on
Cuba.7 ' There, international backlash was equally stern. The EU declared the
extraterritorial provisions of the Helms-Burton Act to be unenforceable within
the EU and affirmed that any damages the US imposed under the Act would be
recoverable. Ultimately, the US had to back down by exempting the foreign
firms from the scope of the sanctions. As these examples show, the US and its
allies' policies are not always aligned. In many cases, the US is forced to buy its
allies' cooperation through a mix of rewards and promises of cooperation in
other foreign policy matters. These rewards, obviously, add to the costs of
sanctions.
Thus, the combination of high costs involved in sanctioning and the low
likelihood of obtaining tangible and lasting benefits through sanctions diminish
their net value and reduce a Sender's incentives to employ them in the first
place.
C. The Cost of Rewards
Sanctions have a simple advantage over rewards. When a mere threat of
sanctions is successful in deterring the violation, the sanctions need not be
carried out and thus cost nothing to the Sender. In contrast, rewards must be
paid in full.78 This is an important reason why domestic law enforcement
normally resorts to sanctions and not rewards. There is not enough money to
pay everyone for compliance. But in the international arena, this advantage of
sanctions is questionable. Threats of sanctions are often not sufficient to induce
compliance. When sanctions are imposed, they often have to be levied for a
73 See Eur Parl Res on Cuba, Art 5, 1996, OJ (C 96) 294 (expressing the council's opinion that ILSA
is in conflict with international law).
74 See id.
75 See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), Pub L No 104-
114, 110 Stat 785, codified at 22 USC §§ 1643(1)-(m), 6021-6091 (2006 & Supp 2009).
76 See Council Regulation 2271/96, Arts 1, 6, 1996 OJ (L 309) 1.
77 See Title III of the Helms-Burton Act 306(b), 110 Stat at 821 (Title III includes a waiver that
allows the US President to suspend the extraterritoriality provision of the Act). US Presidents
have exercised this right to grant a waiver under Title III to alleviate the concerns of foreign
sovereigns. See Shoshana Perl, Whither Helms-Burton? A Retrospective on the 10th Year Anniversary, 6
Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Sen 6 (Feb 2006), online at
http://aei.pitt.edu/8171/1/perlfinal.pdf (visited Nov 15, 2011).
78 See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect, 26 J L,
Econ, & Org 365, 366 (2010).
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lengthy period of time by a large number of states and, even then, they often fail.
Senders may therefore choose to resort to rewards instead. Rewards consist of a
direct transfer of some benefit and can thus be cheaper for a state that wants to
avoid the excess costs of sanctioning.7 1
At times, rewards can be not just cost-effective, but also outright beneficial
to the Sender. If rewards consist of trade liberalization measures, they enhance
social welfare by creating more opportunities for economic exchange. Both
Sender and Target gain from the creation of new trade. The prospect of these
welfare gains solidifies the domestic support for rewards in both the Target and
the Sender country, contributing to the legitimacy and effectiveness of rewards."
Yet often rewards entail important costs. Some rewards are costly because
they trigger a legal obligation to multiply the rewards. A commonly used reward
is an extension of a trade concession-including a lower tariff rate or duty-free
entry to some of Target's imports. This, however, is a costly reward when
applied between members of the WTO. WTO members have a legal obligation
to grant a Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to each other. This means that
states are not allowed to discriminate among their trading partners-in other
words, if a Sender grants a preferential treatment to one WTO member, it is
forced to extend the same concession to all other WTO members. A reward to
one state thus turns into a reward to 153 trading partners.
Moral hazard poses a serious further challenge to a successful reward
strategy, potentially increasing Sender's costs. Enticing recalcitrant nations to
cooperate by offering them rewards distorts incentives. A reward structured as a
one-off transfer also carries the danger that once the reward has been paid, the
Target comes back to the Sender with a new demand in return for continuing its
compliance. At worst, an initial reward fuels a cycle of demands for additional
rewards as the Target seeks to maximize the gains it can extract from the
Sender." The prospect of capturing a reward may even lead to a "race to be a
Target." Imagine that State A offers to reward belligerent states for protecting
the environment. In such a setting, every state has the incentive to understate its
interest in complying in order to qualify for a reward." This means that even
states that were initially inclined to comply may feign a disinclination to comply
79 However, we acknowledge that in the anarchic international system, rewards may not consist of
simple transfers of money or other benefits. Rewards may involve transaction costs. See Drezner,
9 Sec Studies at 188-218 (cited in note 18) (discussing the high costs of contracting, monitoring,
and enforcing international bargains).
so See Long, 40 Intl Studies Q at 77 (cited in note 17).
81 See Haass and O'Sullivan, Conclusion at 165 (cited in note 33).
82 See Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and International Externaliies, 17 Intl Rev L & Econ 309, 315
(1997).
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in order to obtain the package of incentives. Similarly, states lacking incentives
to comply now find it rational to increase their objectionable behavior further in
an effort to obtain an even larger reward from State A.83
The greatest impediment to seeking Target's compliance through rewards
is simply the gap that often exists between what the Target demands and what
the Sender is prepared (or able) to offer. International cooperation on climate
change illustrates this problem: in the Copenhagen climate conference, China
asked developed countries to commit to transferring 1 percent of their GDP to
pay for developing countries' compliance with an international climate treaty. 84
This would amount to a reward of over $300 billion annually-a magnitude that
the deficit-ridden developed countries are highly unlikely to deliver.
This short survey captures the fundamental dilemma in international law:
the absence of a cost-effective enforcement apparatus. Sometimes sanctions are
preferred to rewards; other times rewards are superior. But more often, neither
sanctions nor rewards are capable of generating compliance. Both are too costly
to be effective. In the next Section, we offer a new perspective. Rather than
engage in the standard debate-carrots versus sticks-we show that a more
attractive enforcement mechanism combines the two.
III. THEORY: REVERSIBLE REWARDS
This Section advances a theory on how the Sender can reduce the cost of
enforcement and create a more effective compliance scheme by employing
"Reversible Rewards." We first present a simple numerical example showing
how the proposed mechanism for combining rewards and sanctions
outperforms any simple sanctions or simple rewards scheme. We then explain
informally why the proposed mechanism works better than sanctions or rewards
used in isolation."
A. Simple Model of Enforcement
Consider the following scenario. A Target engages in a behavior or
violation that is harmful to the Sender but beneficial to itself. The Sender can
either sanction the Target in retaliation, or it can reward the Target conditional
on the Target ceasing the violation. Sanctions are costly for the Sender. We
83 See id at 314.
84 See Michael A. Levi, Copenhagen's Inconvenient Truth: How to Salvage the Clmate Conference, 88 Foreign
Aff 92,93 (Sept/Oct 2009).
85 For a formal analysis of Reversible Rewards, see generally Omri Ben-Shahar and Anu Bradford,
Reversible Rewards (University of Chicago Law & Economics Olin Working Paper No 557, June 8,
2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm"abstract-id=1864043 (visited Oct 18,
2011).
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assume that in order to inflict a sanction, S, on the Target, the Sender has to
incur a cost greater than S. For simplicity, assume that there is a fixed cost of 30
to any sanction. That is, the cost of any sanction S is S + 30.
Assume that the violation imposes a cost of 100 on the Sender and
conveys a benefit of 80 to the Target. Also assume that the Sender can induce
the Target to stop the violation if the sanction leaves the Target with a negative
net payoff. That is, the sanction has to impose a cost of at least 80 on the Target
to persuade the Target to give up its benefit from the violation. Given the fixed
cost of 30 attached to any sanction, this means the sanction necessary to stop
the violation costs the Sender at least 110.
In the absence of any enforcement, the Target will commit the violation,
enjoy a benefit of 80, and impose a loss of 100 on the Sender. The Sender can
threaten to inflict a sanction of 80 that would strip the Target of its benefit. But
the cost of such a sanction to the Sender would be at least 110, which exceeds
the harm of 100 that the Sender suffers from the violation. Thus, the Sender's
threat is not credible. A rational Sender prefers to absorb the harm from the
violation (100) rather than incur the total cost of sanctioning (110). A Target,
recognizing this, is not deterred by the threat of a sanction.
A reward could, in principle, induce Target to forgo reprehensible
behavior. Since the Sender has more to lose from the violation than the Target
has to gain-since the violation is inefficient-there is room for a Coasian
bargain, a "bribe."" Any reward of at least 80 and of no more than 100 would
make both parties better off. Assuming, for the moment, that the Sender has
greater bargaining power, it can offer a reward of slightly more than 80 and
induce the Target to comply. In reality, of course, there are various transaction
costs that might impede such a bargain. One such cost is that of detection: a
bribe is worth paying only if the Target's compliance can be verified. This
example does not show that a reward would necessarily succeed. All it shows is
that, under perfect conditions, the reward is going to cost the Sender at least 80.
The reward costs less than the minimum necessary sanction (110) and thus is
superior to a sanction.
Can the Sender do better? Can it induce compliance without having to
spend 80 on a reward? The answer is yes, and this is where the core of our
contribution lies. The Sender can employ Reversible Rewards in the following
way: the Sender offers the Target an amount of money that is substantially lower
than 80 in return for the Target's compliance. Simultaneously, the Sender backs
up this offer of a reward with an explicit threat: if the Target fails to cease the
violation, not only will the Target forfeit the reward, but it will also endure a
86 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Socal Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
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sanction. The cost of inflicting the sanction would be reimbursed to the Sender
from the funds dedicated to the reward. That is, if the Sender has to resort to
sanctions, the initial reward is reversed to the Sender who can use it to cover its
costs of punishing the Target.
Under this scheme, we show that it is enough to offer the Target a reward
of slightly more than 55 (say, 60). This would induce the Target to cease the
violation. To see why, consider the severity of a sanction the Sender would be
willing to impose if the violation continues. Expecting to be reimbursed up to
60, the maximum sanction that the Sender would have an incentive to inflict is
S = 30. This is because the sanction would cost the Sender S + 30 = 60, exactly
the amount that the reversed reward would cover. This would make the sanction
effectively costless to the Sender at the time it would need to be imposed. Thus,
the threat to inflict a sanction of 30 would be ex ante credible.
Recognizing the credibility of the threat to inflict a sanction of S = 30, the
Target has to choose between two options: a violation, which would entail a net
payoff of 50 (that is, a benefit of 80 from continuing violation minus a sanction
of 30); or compliance, which would yield a payoff of 60, directly as a reward. In
this scenario, the Target would choose compliance. Hence, a Reversible Reward
of 60 (or, more precisely, a reward of at least 55) can lead to full compliance.
This is substantially less than the cost of simple sanctions (110) or simple
rewards (80).
B. Reversible Rewards: Why They Work
The above example illustrates that Reversible Rewards can succeed where
simple sanctions fail, and that they cost less than simple rewards. The double effect
of the expenditure, funding both the reward and the punishment, is critical to
the success of this scheme. At times, the Sender may seek to enhance the
credibility of this enforcement strategy by precommitting itself to the dual use of
the enforcement funds. This precommitment effect can be accomplished by placing
the Reversible Rewards in an irrevocable enforcement fund.
1. The double effect.
The Reversible Rewards scheme leverages the same money twice. It is
offered first as a reward incentive for the Target and, second as a sanctioning
incentive for the Sender. The incentive to comply is generated by a "wedge"
between the payoffs from violation and from compliance. The greater this
wedge, the stronger the incentive. This wedge can be stretched in two directions:
87 To be sure, in equilibrium it can be used at most once, but because it is factored into the off-
equilibrium moves-because parties act in the "shadow" of what this money can do-it has a
double effect.
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the Sender can offer a higher payoff for compliance or a lower payoff for
violation. A simple reward operates in the first direction by offering the Target a
higher payoff for compliance. A simple sanction operates in the second direction
by leaving the Target with a lower payoff for violation. Reversible Rewards
operate in both directions-every $1 increases the payoff for compliance by $1
but also reduces the payoff for violation by the amount of sanction that $1 can
fund. Thus, the wedge between payoffs from compliance and noncompliance is
doubled, which in turns doubles the deterrent effect of the money spent.
We use the term "double" effect loosely. More precisely, the effect of
Reversible Rewards could be more or less than double the effect of simple
rewards, depending on the precise magnitude of the cost associated with the
sanction. In the original example sanctions involved an excess cost S + 30 (a
fixed cost of 30). Because of this excess cost, sanctions were less effective than
rewards and thus a Reversible Reward had less than a double effect. Indeed, we
saw that a Reversible Reward of 55 was necessary to achieve a wedge of 80
(enabling the Sender to offer a reward of 55 plus inflict a sanction of 25), to
induce the Target to forgo a benefit of 80 from violation. If the excess cost were
lower, say S + 10, a Reversible Reward of 45 would suffice." In contrast,
sanctions could be more efficient than rewards, in which case Reversible
Rewards would more than double the effect of ordinary rewards. For example, if
the cost of sanction was V2 S, a fund of 27 would be enough to generate
compliance.90 In all these cases, the cost structure of the sanction determines the
exact size of the necessary fund.9' Yet Reversible Rewards always stretch the
wedge and thereby provide additional deterrence.
88 The double effect embedded in Reversible Rewards is related to, albeit different from, discussions
of simultaneous use of rewards and sanctions in Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the
Evolution ofIncentive Structure ofthe Law ofAffirmave Obhligations, 72 Va L Rev 879, 891-94 (1986);
Saul Levmore, Carrts and Torts, in Eric A. Posner, ed, Chicago Lectures in Law and Economics 203,
221 (Foundation 2000). Reversible Rewards differs from Levmore's discussion in that the funding
of the rewards and sanctions is linked, lowering their costs to the Sender. See generally Ian Ayres,
Carrots and Sticks: Unlock the Power ofIncentives to Get Things Done (Bantam 2010).
89 A fund of 45 would enable the Sender to offer a reward of 45 and threaten a sanction of 35,
creating a wedge of 80.
90 A fund of 27 could be used to threaten a sanction of 54. The Target would prefer to take the
reward (27) than to commit a violation and net 80 - 54 = 26. However, we note that when
sanctions entail excess efficiency as opposed to excess costs (for example, collecting a fine from
the Target, which is a costly sanction to the Target but not to the Sender), Sender is more likely to
use simple sanctions than Reversible Rewards.
91 This analysis compares the effectiveness of Reversible Rewards to simple rewards. Alternatively,
we can compare the effectiveness of Reversible Rewards to simple sanctions. Here, too, the effect
could more or less than double depending on the excess cost or excess efficiency associated with
funding rewards. In the original example, we assumed that rewards are zero-cost transfers.
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2. Credible commitment.
Reversible Rewards can deter the Target only if the Sender can credibly
threaten to resort to sanctions in case the Target rejects the reward. The
problem of precommitment to enforcement has been studied before,92 and this
Article offers no new theory on how to resolve it. Reversible Rewards are not a
new commitment device, but rather a method to take advantage of
precommitment strategies, both formal and informal. Thus, our central claim is
that, to the extent that precommitment is possible, Reversible Rewards reduce
the funds the Sender needs to spend on the enforcement effort.
One solution to the credibility problem involves a precommitment of the
Reversible Rewards into an irrevocable fund, managed by an independent
trustee. Under the terms of the fund, these designated funds could only be used
to reward the complying the Target or, failing that, to reimburse the Sender for
the costs of punishing the noncomplying Target. The trustee would be barred
from accommodating any conflicting ex-post instructions by the Sender. Thus, if
the Sender fails to punish an ongoing violation, the reward remains in the fund
and cannot be reclaimed by the Sender. This gives the Sender an incentive to
carry out the punishment, ex ante bolstering the credibility of its threat to do so.
While contract law does not recognize the power of parties to write non-
modifiable binary contracts,93 trust law provides a legal framework to make
effective pre-commitments.94 Sender may also turn to more informal
commitment devices. These may include contracting with a middleman to
administer the Reversible Reward scheme, relying on this intermediary's
reputation to prevent ex-post modifications. Banks, accounting firms, law firms
and arbitrators, even websites (for example, StickK.com),95 specialize in
providing such commitment services, and sometimes are bound by professional
ethics to preserve the original commitment.
Sometimes, however, rewards could involve an excess cost (for example, overhead); other times,
rewards could create efficiency (for example, improve the use of resources).
92 In the civil litigation area, see, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected
Value, in Peter Newman, ed, 3 The New Pagrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 551 (Macmillan
1998). In the criminal area, see, for example, Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners'
(Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J Legal Analysis 737 (2009).
93 Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J Legal
Studies 203, 203 (1997).
94 See generally Kevin E. Davis, The Demand for Immutable Contracts: Another Look at the Law and
Economics of Contract Modifications, 81 NYU L Rev 487 (2006).
95 There, the precommitment is accomplished by contract with a third-party website, and the double
effect is created by directing the deposited bond to a charity least favorable to the designator, in
the event that the designated obligation is not fulfilled. See http://www.stickk.com (visited Oct
18, 2011). See also Ayres, Carrots and Sticks at 76-77 (cited in note 88).
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To illustrate the relevance of a pre-commitment strategy, consider again the
initial example, in which the Sender offers a reward of 60. Suppose the Target
turned down the reward and continued the violation. If this unclaimed reward
was not pre-committed for the purpose of subsequent sanctioning, the Sender
would have no incentive to inflict sanctions. At this point, the strategic situation
would be identical to that of a simple sanctioning scheme. With the option of
using the unclaimed reward for some other purpose, the Sender would factor in
the full cost of 110 in deciding whether to proceed with sanctions. Since the cost
of carrying out the sanction would exceed the harm to the Sender from the
violation, the Sender would not proceed with the sanction. Recognizing this, the
Target would not be deterred by the threat of sanction.
In contrast, if the Reversible Reward was originally placed in an irrevocable
fund, the reward money in the fund would be sunk and could only be recouped
as reimbursement for sanctioning costs. Here, the Sender would be willing to
spend up to the entire fund-60 in our example-to inflict a sanction.
Refraining from imposing sanctions would not benefit the Sender because it
could not reclaim any money left in the fund. Thus, any sanction that costs up to
60 would effectively be free for the Sender. A threat to impose a sanction of 30
(costing the Sender 60) would therefore be credible. The Target, recognizing
this, would now be deterred by the threat of sanction.
Notice that a pre-committed fund can also improve the credibility of a
threat under a simple sanctioning regime. If sanctions are merely retaliatory, the
Sender (who has no ex post incentive to impose them) can successfully deter
violations by pre-committing the money to an irrevocable fund. As long as the
amount in the fund is high enough to impose a sanction that is greater than the
benefit the Target is enjoying, the violation can be deterred. The problem with
such a fund-intended solely for financing the cost of sanctions-is that the
Sender has no incentive to set it up in the first place. As demonstrated above,
the amount of money needed in the fund would exceed the cost of the violation
to the Sender." In other words, the Sender could in theory credibly commit 110
in an irrevocable sanctioning fund and thereby deter the Target. This could be
thought to constitute a superior enforcement strategy, as the Sender would not
have to carry out its threat and thus bear the cost of sanction. However, if the
funds were, indeed, placed in a truly irrevocable fund, the Sender could not have
the funds returned to it later when the Target's compliance is verified without
96 In the companion paper, we explore the strategy of dividing the cost and pre-committing only a
portion of it. In this case, if the remaining cost necessary to fund a sanction is less than the harm
suffered by the Sender, the threat to impose it becomes credible, the violation is deterred, and this
remaining cost need not be incurred. We demonstrate, however, that even if the cost of sanction
is thus divisible, an even smaller sum would need to be pre-committed under the Reversible
Reward fund. See generally Ben-Shahar and Bradford, Reversible Rewards (cited in note 85).
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compromising the assumption that the funds were in a genuinely sunk escrow
arrangement in the first instance. Thus, deterrence would only be accomplished
at the cost of 110, exceeding the harm of 100 to the Sender. As a result, unless
this same fund can be used repeatedly to deter various violations, the Sender
would be dissuaded from a strategy relying on simple sanctions alone.
Still, we recognize that commitment can be difficult and costly to achieve.
Any enforcement device that ultimately depends on the Sender's ability to pre-
commit-whether to simple sanctions, rewards, or Reversible Rewards-might
fail. The advantage of Reversible Rewards would then fail to materialize in the
same way simple sanctions and simple rewards lacking credibility would also fail.
3. Limits of Reversible Rewards.
The above numerical example shows that Reversible Rewards have the
potential to outperform simple rewards and simple sanctions. However, this
result is limited to situations where simple sanctions would fail. Simple sanctions
always dominate Reversible Rewards when a threat of sanctions is credible and
thus need not be carried out. Second, Reversible Rewards are also unlikely to be
helpful in situations where the Sender faces numerous potential Targets, all of
whom can engage (or threaten to engage) in a "generic" violation. In utilizing
Reversible Rewards, the Sender must avoid setting a precedent that all good
behavior can be made subject to the payment of the reward. Otherwise, multiple
states would have the incentive to portray themselves as potential Targets,
whose compliance must be bought off with rewards.
This possible moral hazard problem embedded in any enforcement
mechanism using rewards-whether they are simple or reversible-dictates that
Reversible Rewards are likely to be more useful in scenarios involving a one-of-
a-kind violation by an ex ante identifiable Target. Reversible Rewards also retain
their advantage in settings where multiple potential Targets are capable of
engaging in the same violation but where the Sender only cares about the
behavior of one primary Target. In these scenarios, Reversible Rewards have the
potential to outperform a simple sanction due to the double effect they create.
Indeed, while most international enforcement problems involve multiple
(actual or potential) Targets, Senders only pursue enforcement against a few
selected Targets. Senders may rationally ignore violations by small Targets
capable of inflicting only trivial damage on the Sender. Any attempt by such a
Target to extract a reward from a Sender would be rebuffed. Senders would also
not offer Reversible Rewards to Targets that can credibly be deterred though a
threat of simple sanctions. Reversible Rewards are therefore likely to be utilized
only against a limited number of carefully selected Targets that cannot be
otherwise deterred.
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IV. APPLICATIONS OF REVERSIBLE REWARDS
This Section demonstrates two applications of Reversible Rewards. The
first application involves a bilateral enforcement problem-the efforts of the US
to induce China to terminate its disruption of the foreign currency exchange
markets. Here, one Sender seeks to change the behavior of one Target. The
second application involves a multilateral enforcement problem-the ongoing
effort by a coalition of Senders to induce a group of Targets to cooperate on
climate policy. This introduces a collective action problem among the multiple
Senders. While the bilateral case poses the more straightforward application of
Reversible Rewards, the multilateral case demonstrates another subtle advantage
of this enforcement mechanism as a device for facilitating cooperation.
Both examples involve China as a Target. While Reversible Rewards could
lower the Sender's enforcement costs in disputes with less mighty Targets,
enforcement problems involving powerful Targets are particularly challenging."
It is always costlier for the Sender to restrict trade with another trade power due
to the higher trade volumes involved and the greater likelihood that a powerful
Target will retaliate. The Sender is likely to be able to rely on a threat of simple
sanctions against Targets that it can sanction without inflicting significant costs
on itself. Also, rewards are costlier to employ when a Target is less dependent on
any benefits that a Sender can offer. Reversible Rewards are thus likely to be
particularly attractive when Senders are seeking to influence the behavior of an
economically powerful country like China.
A. Enforcement Conflicts
Enforcement challenges involving China span numerous areas of
international law. China is the most common Target of actions that the US
brings before the WTO. The US frequently challenges China's subsidy policies,
dumping practices, and lax enforcement of intellectual property laws." China's
intervention in the foreign exchange markets has been a longstanding source of
97 However, the model can also be suitable for enforcing certain norms against a smaller Target as
the benefits available from Target's compliance are often too small to outweigh the sanctioning
costs.
98 See Daniel Ikenson, Nonmarket Nonsense: U.S. Anidumping Policy toward China (Cato Inst Center for
Trade Poly Studies Trade Briefing Paper No 22, Mar 7, 2005), online at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbp/tbp-022.pdf (visited Oct 20, 2011) (discussing the antidumping
practices towards China); Sumner J. La Croix and Denise Eby Konan, Intellectual Property Rights in
China: The Changing Political Economy of Chinese-American Interests, 25 World Econ 759, 760-65
(2002) (describing disputes between the US and China over intellectual property rights).
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concern for the US."9 The US and other Western countries have also tried-thus
far unsuccessfully-to amend China's human rights practices or persuade China
to take action to combat climate change."oo All these conflicts share the common
feature that they are difficult to enforce: any sanction aimed at changing China's
behavior is too costly for any potential Sender to carry out. Similarly, any reward
is likely to exceed the costs that the Sender is willing to bear. To illustrate the
enforcement challenges, we focus on two specific conflicts-currency
manipulation and climate change-but the discussion can be extended to
numerous other enforcement problems as well.
1. Currency manipulation.
Of the many tensions in US-China relations, the ongoing conflict over the
value of the Chinese currency, the Yuan, represents the typical shortcoming of
existing international enforcement. The US Congress has repeatedly expressed
its concern that China's intervention in the foreign exchange market artificially
suppresses the value of the Yuan, and threatened to pursue sanctions against
it.1 o' A weak Yuan lowers the price of Chinese goods abroad, giving Chinese
exporters an unfair advantage over their US competitors. At the same time, US
goods are relatively more expensive in China. Several estimates suggest that the
Yuan is undervalued by more than 40 percent relative to the US dollar,
effectively providing a 40 percent subsidy to Chinese exporters selling goods to
the US and a 40 percent tax on US exporters selling goods to China.'0 2 This
policy has also contributed to an unprecedented trade deficit with China-$270
billion in 2010-and led to unsustainable imbalances in the global economy.
9 See Doug Palmer and David Lawder, Geithner Vows to Take China Cureng Dipute to G20, Reuters
(Sept 16, 2010), online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/16/us-usa-china-geithner-
idUSTRE68F16420100916 (visited Oct 20, 2011) (reporting on Treasury Secretary Geithner's
desire to raise the issue of currency manipulation with China as a result of growing consensus
among American policymakers that the issue needs to be addressed).
1o See Anu Bradford and Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionaksm in InternationalLaw, 52 Harv Intl LJ
1, 36 (2011) (discussing President Clinton's backing down from making trade deals with China
conditional on human rights); David Stanway, China Says Rich-Poor Diide Still Dogs Climate Pact
Talks, Reuters (Sept 13, 2010), online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/13/us-china-
climate-idUSTRE68CORS20100913 (visited Oct 20, 2011) (explaining China's continued demand
for "common but differentiated responsibilities" to resolve global warming).
1 See Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011, S 1619.
102 See Doug Palmer, US Treasuy Says China Yuan "Substanialy Undervalued," Reuters (May 27, 2011),
online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/27/usa-china-currency-
idUSN2717209820110527 (visited Oct 20, 2011) (reporting that many lawmakers and
manufacturers in the US claim that China's currency is undervalued by "as much as 40 percent").
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China maintains that a stronger Yuan would hurt its economy by curtailing
its exports, which would impede China's export-led growth.'03 A struggling
export industry would also lead to higher unemployment, which would
undermine social stability.'0 4 China is therefore only prepared to let the Yuan rise
slowly and continues to manage its exchange rate tightly.'0o
While the adverse effects of undervalued Chinese currency are not limited
to the US, a multilateral response to China's currency manipulation is unlikely.
No international institution is likely to induce China to change its exchange rate
policy through either persuasion or punishment. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) would be the natural candidate to be called upon to take action
against China. Yet it has limited means to do so-both legally and politically.'
Challenging China's practices before the WTO is similarly daunting.o' G20
t03 See Michael Pettis, China Needs to Move Slowly on Yuan Revaluation, Bloomberg (Oct 11, 2010),
online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-11/china-must-move-slowly-on-yuan-s-
revaluation-commentary-by-michael-pettis.html (visited Oct 20, 2011).
104 See Li Yanping, China Faces Worst Unemployment in Decades as Slowdown Deepens, Bloomberg (Jan 19,
2009), online at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aEfualBsOUM (visited Oct 20,
2011).
105 Note that the US claims that China would benefit as opposed to lose from a stronger Yuan. The
price of imports would decrease and, consequently, domestic consumption increase. Appreciation
in the value of the Yuan should also contain inflationary pressures. China does not deny its need
to "rebalance" eventually its economy but stresses its inability to do so too quickly. For the
purpose of our argument, we do not need to resolve whether currency manipulation is in China's
interest. Our simple assumption is that the US perceives China's currency intervention to be
costly to the US whereas China perceives such intervention to convey it a benefit.
106 See Robert W. Staiger and Alan 0. Sykes, 'Curreng Manipalation' and World Trade, 9 World Trade
Rev 583, 589-93 (2010). Article IV(1) of the IMF's Articles of Agreement provides that "each
member shall ... avoid manipulating exchange rates ... in order to prevent effective balance of
payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members." Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art IV(1), 60 Stat 1401, TIAS No 1501 (1945), as
amended effective Mar 3, 2011. However, a violation of Article VI(1) is difficult to prove as China
would need to be shown to have the intent to secure an increase in net exports, which China can
rebut by claiming that it is instead intervening in currency markets in order to maintain
macroeconomic stability. Also, the IMF has few tools to punish its powerful members. The most
potent remedy the IMF has is to cut off its lending-hardly an effective threat to a nation holding
over $2.65 trillion in foreign exchange reserves with no need to resort to IMF funds now or in the
future. See Paul Panckhurst, et al, China Foreign-Exchange Reserves jump to $2.65 Trillion, Bloomberg
(Oct 13, 2010), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-13/china-s-currency-
reserves-surge-to-record-fueling-calls-for-stronger-yuan.htmI (visited Oct 20, 2011).
107 See Staiger and Sykes, 9 World Trade Rev at 593-606 (cited in note 106). Article XV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT Agreement) prohibits member states from
engaging in exchange action that frustrates the intent of the GATT Agreement. See GATT
Agreement, Art XV, 14, 55 UN Treaty Ser 194 (1947). However, no cases have ever been
litigated under the article. The success of a claim under Article XV would also hinge on the IMF's
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countries are seeking to address global economic imbalances among their
members but have little means of enforcing their "indicative guidelines" on
countries that manage their exchange rates and run persistently large
imbalances. 08
Unlike the US-which has repeatedly signaled its discontent with China's
currency regime-other trade powers affected by China's managed currency are
not lining up to pursue sanctions against China. For instance, while the EU's
trade deficit with China has been soaring, its overall current account is largely in
balance. The EU also remains reluctant to criticize China's trade imbalances
given the existing internal trade imbalances within the EU. Germany, for
instance, is accused of running an unsustainable trade surplus.'" The EU is
therefore not likely to act upon China's trade imbalances without first addressing
the economic policies of its own surplus countries.
Similarly, while China is not the only country that intervenes in its currency
markets, the US is predominantly concerned with the impact of China's current
practices because of the sheer volume of US-China trade affected by China's
conduct. We therefore assume the US to be the lone Sender and China the lone
Target of a unilateral enforcement action.
2. Climate change.
There is broad agreement among states that international cooperation to
fight climate change is vital to global welfare and security. Because climate
change is a global phenomenon, it cannot be solved by any nation alone. Even
while states have gradually acknowledged that they must collectively reduce the
total quantity of greenhouse gases (GHG) that they emit into the atmosphere,
there is no consensus on how to allocate this responsibility among states. No
state wants to bear the disproportionate cost of reducing its emissions while
allowing other states to continue emitting. Furthermore, questions of relative
determination of whether the member's exchange policies violated Article XV, showing unusual
deference and implying the WTO's hesitation to act on currency disputes.
108 See also Meeting ofFinance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, G20 Communiqu6 (Apr 15, 2011),
online at http://www.g20.org/Documents2011/04/G20/o20Washington%2014-
15%20April%202011%20-%20final%20communique.pdf (visited Oct 20, 2011); Ralph Atkins
and Quentin Peel, G20 Strikes Compromise on Global Imbalances, Fin Times (Feb 19, 2011) online at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/1al2713e-3c56-1leO-b073-
00144feabdcO.html#axzzlbMqxgvll (visited Oct 20, 2011); G20 Agrees Guidelines to Measure
Economic Imbalances, BBC News (Apr 15, 2011), online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
13098537 (visited Oct 20, 2011) (describing the G20 system for monitoring economic imbalances
and noting that it lacks even a "name and shame" list to encourage compliance).
109 See Patrick A. Messerlin, Should Europe join the US in Condemning Chinese Curmeny Manpulaion? (Vox
Apr 16, 2010), online at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4854 (visited Oct 20, 2011)
(arguing that the EU is not likely to join the US in criticizing the Chinese trade imbalance because
many EU economies, particularly Germany's, share the same characteristic).
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burdens and comparative fault have frustrated efforts to find a solution that
overcomes the collective action problem underlying climate change." 0
Over 190 countries are involved in a UN-led effort to negotiate a treaty
that would replace the Framework Convention on Climate Change and its
Kyoto Protocol."' In 2009, these countries gathered in Copenhagen, in what
was arguably the most high-powered international environmental negotiation
ever, to attempt to launch the new treaty regime. The negotiations failed; no
legally binding agreement was reached, nor did the states manage to set
quantified emission reduction targets. The gap between the resources that China
and other developing countries requested in exchange for their compliance, and
what the developed countries were prepared to commit to, was visibly high." 2
States have since tried to revive the treaty process, but few believe that states
have the ability to overcome the collective action problem surrounding climate
change anytime soon."'
At the risk of oversimplifying, we divide the states participating in climate
negotiations into two familiar categories: "Senders" and "Targets." Senders are
supporters of the proposed treaty: they are willing to limit their GHG emissions
and to try to persuade other states to do the same. Targets are states that refuse
to sign the treaty and seek to free ride on Senders' efforts to curb GHG
emissions. Almost every multilateral sanctioning episode has one lead Sender
that heads the efforts to organize the sanctions regime." 4 There are also other
potential co-Senders that would prefer to free ride on the lead Sender's efforts
but could be persuaded to join the enforcement effort. In building a coalition of
sanctioning states, the lead Sender is often forced to offer rewards to potential
co-Senders or to threaten them with sanctions, or else accept their free riding
and bear the sanctioning costs alone. Thus, the lead Sender faces a two-fold task:
first, it must convince more states to join the negotiations as co-Senders and not
110 Efforts to reach a solution on climate change are frustrated in two underlying features of the
problem: distributional conflict that undermines the bargaining stage and incentives to defect that
undermine the enforcement stage of international climate change cooperation. See generally
James D. Fearon, Bargaining Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 Intl Org 269 (1998).
111 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997),
2303 UN Treaty Ser 162 (2005).
112 See Fiona Harvey, Ed Crooks, and Andrew Ward, A Discordant Accord, Fin Times Asia Ed 5 (Dec
21, 2009).
113 See, for example, Fiona Harvey, Cancun Offers Slm Hopes of Progress, Fin Times 3 (Nov 1, 2010)
(reporting that many observers and participants had little expectation of a climate change
agreement because of growing distrust among nations and continuing policy differences).
114 See Martin, 45 World Pol at 408 (cited in note 37).
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as Targets; and, second, it must pursue collective enforcement measures with
these co-Senders against the remaining Targets.115
The EU is perceived as a lead Sender in the area of climate change, because
it has the greatest motivation and resources to enforce a climate treaty.
European countries are geographically vulnerable to climate change."' The EU
has a low carbon/GDP ratio and thus bears relatively low total costs in reducing
its GHG emissions compared to carbon-intensive economies like the US, China,
and Australia."' European countries are also committed to taking action to curb
their emissions because of their heightened domestic awareness of the dangers
of climate change." 8 Indeed, in preparation for the negotiations in Copenhagen,
the EU led the charge by promulgating more ambitious emissions reduction
commitments than any other major participant to the negotiations."'
Among the climate change Targets, China is the most important. China has
weak incentives to join the climate treaty. For one, China is expected to feel the
adverse effects of climate change to a lesser extent than many other nations.'20
115 See Martin, 45 World Pol at 410-13 (cited in note 37). This assumption of asymmetrical interests
between Senders rules out certain games like coordination games. It is also not a Prisoner's
Dilemma, as the leading Sender has a dominant strategy to impose sanctions.
116 Although European countries are not as geographically vulnerable to climate change as India,
Africa, or some small island nations, they are more at risk than countries like China. See Eric A.
Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Georgetown L J 1565, 1580-83 (2008); see
also William D. Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming
69-98 (MIT 2000). Most threatened among the European Countries are the many coastal, low-
lying countries, including the Netherlands. See Pam Berry, Climate Change and the Vulnerability of
Bern Convention Spedes and Habitats, in 1 Biodiversity and Climate Change: Reports and Guidance Developed
under the Bern Convention, 156 Nature and Environment 105, 125 (Council of Eur 2010).
117 Most European countries are not major producers of fossil fuels (including coal) or energy-
intensive products (including aluminum, steel, iron, cement, glass, and chemicals). Due to their
lower carbon/GDP ratio, they do not expect to suffer as many costs in moving away from fossil
fuels. See International Energy Agency, CO Emissions Frm Fuel Combustion: Highlights, **91, 94
(OECD 2011), online at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdf (visited Nov 15,
2011) (listing countries by their GDP per emissions).
118 The presence of many active environmental NGOs and the participation of green parties in many
coalition governments ensure that political support for environmental policies is strong.
119 EU promised to cut its emissions to at least 20 percent below 1990 emissions levels by 2020. The
EU further pledged to reduce its emissions 30 percent below 1990 levels on the condition that
other developed countries agree to make similar reductions and that developing countries also
subscribe to the Global Climate Change Treaty. See European Commission, The Copenhagen
Climate Change Negotiations: EU Position and State of Play (Nov 9, 2009), online at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/493&format=HTMIL&a
ged=0&1anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (visited Oct 20, 2011).
120 See Posner and Sunstein, 96 Georgetown L J at 1582-83 (cited in note 116). See also Richard S.J.
Tol, Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change, Part II: Dynamic Estimates, 21 Envir & Resource
Econ 135, 156 (2002) (estimating that Centrally Planned Asia's benefit from moderate global
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At the same time, China's abatement costs of fighting climate change are
distinctly high. China recently overtook the US as the largest emitter of GHGs
in the world, 121 and its emissions are constantly growing because of its thriving
economy.122 China's comparative advantage in international manufacturing is
partly based on low energy costs due to its enormous coal reserves. The Chinese
government also sees economic growth as fundamental for the prosperity and
stability of the state, and is unlikely to prioritize environmental protection over
meeting this goal for decades to come.123 China would face distinctly high costs
from emission reductions because it would require reallocation of resources
from other pressing societal needs, such as poverty alleviation, nutrition, and
health care. Politically, China maintains that the primary responsibility for
reducing GHG emissions lies with developed countries and insists on adherence
to the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" that the Kyoto
Protocol reflects.124
Compared to the EU or China, the role of the US is more ambiguous.
Historically, the US has resisted international efforts to combat climate change.
It has a relatively high capacity to adapt to climate change 25 and is not expected
to suffer from climate change to the extent that many other states will. 26 The
US' reliance on abundant domestic coal creates a high carbon/GDP ratio,
resulting in costly transition to a low-carbon economy. However, more recently
warming would amount to nearly 2 percent of its GDP over the next century). But see Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S Cal L Rev 905, 919-23 (2008).
121 See Gas Exchange: CO2 Emissions 1990-2006, 447 Nature 1031, 1038 (June 28, 2007).
122 See Vandenbergh, 81 S Cal L Rev at 917 (cited in note 120). See also Richard B. Stewart and
Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing Clmate Pokiy: Beyond Kyoto 38 n 3 (AEI 2003) (noting that in
2020, 50 percent of the total emissions are expected to originate from developing countries, most
notably from China and India).
123 See Yang Yao, The End of the Beging Consensus: Can China's Model of Authoritarian Growth Survive?,
Foreign Aff (Feb 2, 2010), online at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-
the-beijing-consensus (visited Oct 20, 2011).
124 See National Development and Reform Commission, Implementation of the Bali Roadmap: China's
Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (Nat Dev & Reform Commn May 20, 2009),
online at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20090521_280382.htm (visited Oct 20, 2011).
125 Developed countries, the US included, are generally less vulnerable to climate change because of
their superior economic and technical resources to prepare for and respond to the effects of
climate change. Their economies are also less dependent on agriculture, which is the sector of the
economy most vulnerable to the threat of climate change. Further, developed countries are
generally cooler places that can handle the warming effects, unlike many developing countries that
already struggle with heat and drought. See Posner and Sunstein, 96 Georgetown L J at 1580
(cited in note 116).
126 See Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change 139 (Cambridge 2007); Nordhaus and Boyer,
Warming the World at 91 (cited in note 116). See also Posner and Sunstein, 96 Georgetown L J at
1580 (cited in note 116).
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the US has shown some willingness to limit its emissions and join the treaty-
under strictly defined conditions. Prior to the Copenhagen summit, the US
pledged to cut its emissions to 17 percent below its 2005 emissions levels by
2020 pending congressional approval.127 The US has also indicated that it is
prepared to participate in international climate change cooperation assuming it
can ensure participation by other states, including developing countries.128 This
suggests that if a treaty were to include strong enforcement measures against
major Targets, most notably China, the US could be persuaded to play the role
of the co-Sender.129
Going forward, we assume a multilateral enforcement setting where the
EU and the US act jointly as Senders in an effort to convince China to reduce its
GHG emissions to the level determined by the Senders. This enforcement
strategy could-simultaneously or subsequently-be applied to other key
Targets (including India) through separate Reversible Reward accounts. We
further assume that while other Targets continue to emit GHGs, the Senders are
either prepared to ignore their violations due to their trivial effect on the climate,
or to be in a position to credibly deter these Targets through sanctions.
In these two contexts-currency manipulation and carbon emissions-
diplomacy, self-enforcing international agreements, and other modes of
persuasion have failed. If Targets' behavior were to change, it would have to be
induced by incentives, either sanctions or rewards. So far, political discourse in
the US has almost exclusively focused on sanctions in both cases. The discussion
below shows that reliance on sanctions may be the least effective and most
costly way for the US to ensure China's compliance. At the same time, offering
simple rewards to China would constitute an irrational strategy because the US
would overpay for China's compliance. Instead, we show that China's
127 See Office of the White House Press Secretary, President to Attend Copenhagen Climate Talks (Nov
25, 2009), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-attend-copenhagen-
climate-talks (visited Oct 20, 2011). See also John Broder, Obama to Go to Copenhagen With Emissions
Target, NY Times Al (Nov 25, 2009). According to the Pew Research Center for the People and
the Press survey of September/October 2009, 65 percent of the US public considers climate
change to be a "very serious" or "somewhat serious" problem, even after a steady decline in the
number of people holding such opinion. Modest Support for "Cap and Trade" Poiy: Fewer Americans
See Sold Evidence of Global Warming *1 (Pew Rsrch Center Oct 22, 2009), online at http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/556.pdf (visited Oct 20, 2011).
128 The inability to entice developing countries to assume binding obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol was an important reason that the Senate opposed US participation in the Protocol. See
S Res 98, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (une 12, 1997), in 143 Cong Rec S 5623 (June 12, 1997)
(statement of Sen Byrd).
129 This assumption is consistent with the Waxman-Markey climate change bill that passed the House
of Representatives on June 26, 2009. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, HR
2454 §5 765-69.
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compliance may, in both instances, be purchased more cheaply through
Reversible Rewards.
B. Sanctions
1. Available sanctions.
Trade sanctions constitute the most likely punishment strategy against
China. Targeting China's imports on the Sender's border is at least theoretically a
feasible strategy and has the greatest potential to hurt China, given China's
emphasis on export-led economic growth. Other types of sanctions-including
withdrawal of economic or military assistance-can be successful in securing
compliance of a country that is economically or militarily dependent on the
Sender. However, sanctions that can be effectively employed against a
superpower are much more limited.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988130 provides the US a
domestic statutory authority to pursue trade sanctions against a currency
manipulator.13 1 Mounting voices in the US Congress are calling for the US
Treasury to act upon this authority and to impose tariffs on goods originating
from China.132 These proposed tariffs would offset the artificial subsidy that the
undervalued currency offers to Chinese exporters and would thus have to equal
the benefit Chinese manufacturers derive from an undervalued Yuan-which
some economists claim is undervalued by as much as 40 percent.133 Tariffs can
also be a preferred strategy in times of economic recession or during periods of
slow growth: they generate direct revenue for the US government, which can be
further invested to bolster exports and employment in sectors that are most
affected by China's foreign exchange policies.
Similarly, in climate policy, the EU and the US have identified carbon
border taxes (carbon tariffs) as a feasible strategy against countries that do not
130 Pub L No 100-418, 102 Stat 1107, codified at various sections of Title 19.
131 The Act requires the US Treasury to issue semiannual reports on countries' exchange rate
policies. If the Treasury declares a country a currency manipulator, the Act requires it to enter
into negotiations with the offending country. Should the negotiations fail, the Act then requires
the US to impose at least a 25 percent tariff on the imports by the currency manipulator.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 5§ 3004-05, 102 Stat at 1273-75, codified at 22
USC $5 5304-05.
132 In 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsey Graham proposed a bill that called for a 27.5
percent tariff on all imports from China, should China fail to revalue the Yuan. S 295, 109th
Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 3, 2005). More recently, Senators Sherrod Brown, Charles Schumer, and
Lindsey Graham, among others, sponsored a bill calling for antidumping duties and
countervailing duties to be imposed on Chinese imports. Currency Exchange Rate Oversight
Reform Act of 2011, S 1619 (cited in note 2).
133 See Palmer, US Treasury Says China Yuan "Substantialy Undervalued" (cited in note 102).
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sign onto the climate treaty or do not otherwise assume comparable
commitments domestically.134 The EU and the US would impose a carbon tariff
at the border on products imported from countries that fail to charge their
domestic producers for their GHG emissions. The tariff would reflect the
carbon tax or permit that similar domestic products bear. Since the US and the
EU markets account for 41 percent of Chinese exports, which represent 14 to
28 percent of all Chinese carbon dioxide emissions, these two Senders together
can put significant pressure on China to transform its energy infrastructure.13 5
The minimum costs imposed by the carbon tariffs would have to equal the
benefit Chinese manufacturers derive from externalizing the carbon cost. Such a
tariff would eliminate the unfair comparative advantage of Chinese
manufacturers relative to domestic producers, who would be subject to GHG
emission caps or a domestic carbon tax. It would also mitigate the so-called
leakage problem created by producers relocating to "pollution havens" because
they would not be able to export their products at reduced cost to countries
applying a carbon tariff. Finally, the tariff would also generate direct revenue for
the EU and US governments that could be further invested in these countries'
efforts to fight climate change within their domestic markets. These measures
would obviously price only the emissions embodied in exports that are destined
for the EU or the US, and would not reach emissions that "stay" in the Target
state. They are, therefore, only effective against export-oriented Targets like
China.
2. Cost of sanctions.
A decision to impose a tariff on Chinese imports would carry several costs.
First, at a very basic level, tariffs require administrative expense. To implement
the tariff, the US would need to devote additional resources to the existing US
Customs and Border Protection agency. In the currency manipulation case, the
agency would need to estimate the "Chinese content" of various products at the
134 French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a carbon border tariff on nations that failed to
address climate change. See Frank McDonald, Call For EU Carbon Taiffs on Imports From Defaulters,
Irish Times 12 (an 28, 2010). Various bills that have been proposed or that are currently pending
in the US Congress contain provisions calling for border measures to be imposed on goods that
originate from countries that do not limit the carbon content of their products. The American
Clean Energy Security Act that passed the House of Representatives in 2009 included a provision
that would trigger border tariffs in 2020 if other major emitters had not taken significant action
on climate change. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, HR 2454 5§ 765-69.
135 See Vandenbergh, 81 S Cal L Rev at 911 (cited in note 120). But see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Steve
Charnovitz, and Jisun Kim, Global Warming and the World Trading System 13 (Peterson Inst Intl
Econ 2009) (noting that the US imports carbon-intensive goods primarily from Canada and the
EU, and that in 2007, for instance, China accounted for only 11 percent of the carbon-intensive
imports in five key product groups-steel, aluminum, chemicals, paper, and cement).
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border. A possible circumvention of imports through third countries would add
to the difficulty and cost of defining the origin of the goods. Administering a
carbon tariff would likely involve even higher costs: the EU and the US customs
officials would need to estimate the carbon content of the Chinese products at
the border, a task that would be complicated by the absence of accurate
information on the production methods employed by Chinese producers.'36
Second, tariffs would impose great economic costs. Cheap Chinese
imports, which currently benefit millions of US and EU consumers and are used
as inputs in local manufacturing, would become more expensive. For example,
Wal-Mart alone imported goods worth $27 billion from China in 2006.'11
Consumers' and commercial buyers' welfare would be diminished, therefore,
whether by paying more for the same goods or switching to alternative sources
of supply.
Third, Chinese exporters may successfully divert trade to other countries
that do not impose tariffs on its products. This would diminish some of the
intended effect of the sanction. This method of avoiding the tariffs would be
considerably harder when the US and the EU are enforcing sanctions jointly.
But even then the US and EU may need to seek relevant third countries to join
the measure as additional co-Senders to mitigate the harm caused by successful
trade diversion. This might require costly transfers if these third countries
conditioned their cooperation on various rewards from the US and the EU-
further adding to the costs of sanctioning.
Finally, a tariff regime in either case would likely lead to a WTO challenge,
and, if China prevailed (and the US failed to comply), to China's retaliation
against the Senders' products.'38 By threatening to retaliate, China increases the
Senders' expected cost of sanctioning. This is one of the primary reasons why
some US exporters oppose the idea of imposing trade sanctions against China in
136 See Gilbert E. Metcalf and David Weisbach, The Design ofa Carbon Tax, 33 Harv Envir L Rev 499,
550 (2009). See also Joost Pauwelyn, US Federal Cimate Pol&g and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits
and Options of International Trade Law **6--7 (Nicholas Inst Working Paper No 07-02, Apr 2007),
online at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/u.s.-federal-climate-policy-and-
competitiveness-concerns-the-limits-and-options-of-international-trade-law (visited Oct 20, 2011).
137 See Robert E. Scott, The Wal-Mart Efect: Its Chinese Imports Have Displaced Nearly 200,000 U.S. Jobs
(Econ Poly Inst June 25, 2007), online at http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/ib235/ (visited
Oct 20, 2011).
138 There is an extensive literature discussing whether a carbon tariff would be consistent with the
WTO regime. See, for example, Pauwelyn, US Federal Clmate Pody and Competitiveness Concerns
**12-23 (cited in note 136); Jagdish Bhagwati and Petros C. Mavroidis, Is Acion against US Exports
for Failure to Sign Kyoto Protocol WTO-Legal?, 6 World Trade Rev 299, 310 (2007); Ludivine Tamiotti,
et al, Trade and Climate Change, WTO-UNEP Report **88-115 (WTO 2009), online at
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/trade-cimatechange-e.pdf (visited Oct 20,
2011).
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connection with the currency dispute. Should China proceed to retaliate, it
would likely choose to target industries such as agriculture and high-technology
sectors, both of which have high economic or political value and are hence more
likely to lead the US government to abandon the punitive tariffs.' At worst, a
conflict over tariffs could escalate into a full-blown trade war across a range of
economic sectors, leading to unprecedented costs in terms of contraction of
world trade.
Despite these high costs, sanctioning would still be rational if the Senders
incurred even higher costs by tolerating China's noncompliance. Knowing this,
China could strategically lower its violation to the level that still imposes costs
on Senders but does not justify the costs of imposing sanctions. For instance,
China might choose to allow its currency to appreciate somewhat-not too
much, so as to keep its exports competitive, yet enough to make sure that the
US' benefits from any further appreciation of the Yuan remain below its cost of
punishing China. This will allow China to engage in the maximum tolerable
behavior that remains unpunished.o Indeed, China has recently allowed for
modest appreciation of the Yuan. Thus, while threats of sanctions could operate
in the background to create deterrence, they would be effective in deterring only
China's most egregious interventions in the currency market, while always failing
to deter the more moderate (but nevertheless socially costly) levels of
intervention.
Similarly, China could preempt climate change sanctions by strategically
limiting its GHG emissions in certain sectors of the economy in order to bring
down its overall level of emissions while allowing some other sectors-in
particular those that are the key to its economic growth-to continue polluting.
China may also selectively reduce its emissions in export-oriented sectors in
order to limit its exposure to border measures, without reducing its overall
GHG emissions. China might also limit its export of steel, glass, and other
carbon-intensive products yet continue to export so called "carbon-
derivatives"-products whose carbon content is difficult and costly to
determine. These measures would allow China to escape sanctions by lowering
its violations to a level that Senders would find cost-ineffective to punish.
Reduced emission levels would diminish the direct harm the EU and the US
139 Risa A. Brooks, Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?, 11 Sec Studies 1, 40 (Summer
2002).
14 Uncertainty for either actor can complicate the analysis. Because errors are not symmetrically
costly, uncertainty would give both sides an incentive to act with greater caution. All else equal,
China would set a level of violation below what it would otherwise allow for itself, and the US
would set a threshold of punishment more lenient that it would otherwise employ if detection
were perfect. See generally Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J L, Econ, & Org 279 (1986).
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suffer, and consequently, the attractiveness for administering a costly system of
border measures. Thus, again, the main problem with costly sanctions is that
they are capable of deterring only China's most reprehensible violations, but not
violations that are socially costly but for which the cost of deterrence exceeds
the harm to the coalition of Senders.
C. Rewards
Recognizing the limits of the sanctioning strategy, the US could
alternatively offer China rewards in return for its decision to discontinue
intervening in the currency markets. Similarly, the US and the EU could forgo
sanctions and offer China rewards in exchange for its climate compliance. The
idea of rewarding China would, undoubtedly, be difficult to justify to the
domestic audience-yet the US has a long history of rewarding belligerent
countries for their cooperation. 14 1 Positive inducements, while domestically
unpopular, have been chosen as tools of influence when sanctions have been too
costly, risky or simply unavailable. Importantly, the analysis in Section II above
suggests that rewards may at times induce compliance at a lower cost because
they save the deadweight loss associated with sanctions.
1. Available rewards.
China presents a particularly challenging case for a reward strategy. Unlike
a small developing economy with a limitless need for possible rewards from a
large developed economy, China is harder to coerce by extending a traditional
reward-for example, direct cash transfer in the form of foreign aid.142 China is
the world's second largest economy, the largest exporter, the second largest
importer, and the holder of the largest amount of foreign currency reserves.
Further, many of the traditional carrots have also already been used: China
is a member of the WTO, benefiting from the Most Favored Nations (MFN)
tariff rates. Further trade opening would yield only marginal additional benefits
and be difficult to execute, given that the WTO prevents favorable treatment of
any single trade partner. Thus, if the US were to open further some sector of the
economy that remains protected (for instance, agriculture) as a reward, the US
would be forced to extend the same benefit to all other WTO member states
141 See Section II.A2.
142 There are other types of rewards that would likely appeal to China. For instance, China wants
more power in international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. China also wants
to be left alone in human rights issues-thus, a commitment not to interfere in China's handling
of Tibet or in other sensitive questions dealing with civil and political rights would have "value"
for China.
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under the WTO's MFN obligation. This multiplier effect would make the reward
extremely costly.
Still, despite its rapidly growing economy, China continues to claim that it
is a poor developing country. In terms of GDP per capita, China ranks 125th in
the world.'43 Lfting people out of poverty is the Chinese government's primary
concern. The government knows that its authoritarian rule rests in its ability to
alleviate poverty and spread wealth to a steadily increasing number of its citizens.
Thus, notwithstanding China's vast economic resources, it is sensitive to the
opportunity costs of deploying them-in particular when its investments in
compliance would also reduce its economic growth. This might make China
open to accepting monetary rewards in some instances. Yet traditional rewards
are unlikely to solve the bilateral currency dispute between the US and China.
The US alone may not be able or willing to amass the kind of money that would
persuade China to forgo its currency intervention. Instead, the US may consider
other types of rewards that have clear monetary value for China. For instance,
China has repeatedly insisted on being treated as a "market economy" for the
purposes of US antidumping investigations.'" Removing the nonmarket
economy status with respect to antidumping investigations would lead to less
frequent and less severe antidumping duties against Chinese companies.145
Another potential reward relates to China's request that the US lift some of its
existing export controls of high-technology products to China. 146
The US could also promise to discontinue arms sales to Taiwan. The US
regularly supplies Taiwan with state of the art military technologies. 4 7 These
major arms deals are significant for US manufacturers of military equipment.
Most recently, in 2010, the Obama administration approved a $6 billion arms
package to Taiwan. China condemned the deal, stating that the sale harms its
143 US Central Intelligence Agency, China, World Factbook (Oct 18, 2011), online
athttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (visited Oct 20,
2011).
144 See Scott Otteman, Zhong: More U.S. Exports, Less Curbs Will Slash Trade Gap Better than Cunency
Shifi, Inside US-China Trade (Mar 31, 2010), online at http://wtonewsstand.com/Inside-US-
China-Trade/Inside-U.S.-China-Trade-03/31/2010/menu-id-715.html (visited Oct 20, 2011).
145 Antidumping duties are imposed on goods that are sold at too low value on the US market. To
determine whether dumping exists, the US Department of Commerce compares the price of the
good in the US and in the exporting country. However, in case of nonmarket economies, the US
insists that it cannot use the price data of the exporting country-the rationale being that prices in
nonmarket economies are not set by market forces. This allows the US authorities to reject the
information China provides in antidumping investigations and thereby treat Chinese exporters
less favorably than exporters from market economies.
146 See Otteman, More US Exports, Less Curbs (cited in note 144).
147 The Taiwan Relations Act, Pub L No 96-8, 93 Stat 14 (1979), codified at 22 USC 55 3301-16,
requires the US to provide Taiwan with means to defend itself. 22 USC §§ 3301-02.
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national security and peaceful reunification efforts. China also indicated that the
deal would seriously undermine US-China bilateral relations. 148 A government-
imposed ban on arms sales to Taiwan would therefore likely be a particularly
welcome reward for China.
The idea of rewards has been central to the discussions about the climate
treaty.149 Throughout the negotiation process, developing countries have insisted
that their compliance with a treaty will be conditioned on securing a binding
commitment from developed countries to finance the costs of developing
countries' compliance. China has explicitly indicated that it is willing to comply
with a treaty if rich countries will pay for its costs of compliance. Recently,
developed countries consented to these demands by stating their "intention" to
provide the necessary funds. The Copenhagen Accord promulgates a goal of
establishing a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (Climate Fund), which would be
aimed at assisting developing countries to mitigate the effects of climate
change. 150
2. Cost of rewards.
China would likely require a substantial reward in exchange for letting its
currency float. At a minimum, the reward would need to amount to China's net
costs of allowing for the Yuan's appreciation. Importantly, the reward would
need to cover the costs of China's reduced export revenue in all exports
markets-not just in the US-as well as likely adjustment costs resulting from a
presumably higher rate of unemployment.
Yet such a reward would likely exceed the US' willingness to pay, given that
the US does not internalize all the costs associated with China's objectionable
148 See Helene Cooper, U.S. Approval of Taiwan Arms Sales Angers China, NY Times AS (Jan 30, 2010).
149 Jeffrey Sachs has called for two global trust funds to be established: a mitigation fund that would
offer transfer payments for the purpose of adopting new emission technologies and a technology
transfer fund that would provide poorer countries access to (often IP-protected) technologies that
can be harnessed to reduce countries' GHG emissions. Sachs has stressed that the fund would
require donor countries to commit approximately 0.5 percent of their GNP to the fund. This
would amount to $170 billion annually that could be directed to recipient countries to compensate
them for their efforts to mitigate climate change. See Rashme Sehgal, Cmate Change According to
Jeffrey Sachs, Infochange (Aug 2009), online at
http://infochangeindia.org/environment/features/cimate-change-according-to-jeffrey-
sachs.html (visited Oct 20, 2011). See also Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Povery: Economic Possibilties for
Our Time 302-03 (Penguin 2005); Gordon Brown, All Together Now, NY Times A35 (Sept 23,
2009).
150 See UN, Draft Decision CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (2009).
Specifically, developed countries would provide developing countries with financial support of
$100 billion annually by 2020, with an additional pledge to offer these countries up to $10 billion
of upfront financing annually through 2012. While lacking any binding force, the mere statement
of this goal was considered a tangible achievement in otherwise disappointing negotiations.
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behavior. For one thing, it is hard to imagine the political feasibility of the US
Congress appropriating funds to compensate China for ending a palpable
wrong-doing. Moreover, the US only cares about the direct benefits that it
expects to derive from the Yuan's appreciation, including increased export
revenue from increased sales in China and the strengthening of its own
producers' relative competitiveness to Chinese manufacturers at home and in
third markets. In contrast, the US is not expected to take into account the
benefits that the Yuan's appreciation would have on third countries (including,
for instance, increased competitiveness of European firms). Given its perception
of high economic benefits of undervalued currency, China may thus be better
off pursuing its chosen monetary policy than accepting a (limited) reward
offered by the US.
Similar problems undermine the Senders' ability to buy China's climate
compliance through rewards. For the reward to be attractive to China, it would
need to amount to the net costs of participating in the treaty. Specifically, the
reward would have to cover China's costs of cutting its GHG emissions,
including the cost of adopting new energy solutions. It would also need to cover
the costs of reduced growth rates, the possible forgone benefits from global
warming that China would enjoy absent any action,"' and the forgone benefits
that China would enjoy though "leakage" of energy-intensive production to its
territory. In setting the reward, the Senders could deduct from these costs
China's (discounted) long-term benefits of halting global warming and its more
immediate co-benefits of any abatement action, including better air quality and
the associated health benefits."' Still, the magnitude of the reward would need
to be substantial. This is supported by China's explicit request that wealthy
nations commit 1 percent of their GDP-over $300 billion annually-to a fund
that would help developing countries, including China, cut their emissions and
adapt to climate change. 53
Critics point out that even if the Copenhagen Accord's pledged funding
materialized, it would fall short of the demands by developing countries,
international organizations, and NGOs."' Developing countries also fear that
151 Even if China does not benefit from climate change, it may be less exposed to impacts than other
developing countries. See Posner and Sunstein, 96 Georgetown L J at 1582 (cited in note 116).
152 See discussion on side-benefits to China in Stewart and Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy at 103
(cited in note 122).
153 See Levi, 88 Foreign Aff at 93 (cited in note 84).
154 See Why the G8 Needs to Finance Developing Country Climate Action (Greenpeace July 3, 2009), online
at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/reports/why-the-g8-needs-to-
finance-de/ (visited Oct 21, 2011) (demanding $140 billion annually by 2020); The EU Is Treating
Climate Deal like an eBay Novice (Oxfam Intl Oct 30, 2009), online
athttp://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2009-10-30/eu-treating-climate-deal-ebay-
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the funds to cover the reward would merely be diverted from existing
development aid budgets, compromising the effectiveness of other development
programs and initiatives in developing countries."' Thus, given the high
economic benefits of continuing emissions, Targets, including China, may be
better off violating the treaty than accepting an inadequate reward from the
proposed Climate Fund.
This discussion shows that extending a traditional reward to a Target like
China may simply be too costly for the EU and the US-even when funding the
reward jointly-making it impossible to garner domestic support for the fund.
This is particularly true when the Sender who funds the reward does not
internalize all the costs associated with the violations. For instance, the EU only
cares about the direct benefits that it derives from China's compliance, including
a mitigated risk of suffering adverse consequences from climate change in the
EU territory, reduced leakage of carbon-intensive production, the strengthening
of its own producers' competitiveness, and expanded export opportunities for
its own producers that manufacture clean technologies that China would
possibly be required to purchase as a condition for obtaining the reward. The
EU is not generally expected to care about the benefits China's compliance
would have on third countries (including the Maldives remaining above sea level
or India's agricultural sector remaining productive). Similar considerations
constrain the extent to which the US is prepared to offset the harm it
experiences with a reward.
Thus, it is likely that the largest fund that the EU-US coalition would be
willing to support would not cover the benefit China would be asked to forgo,
particularly if the Senders apply a high discount rate in assessing the detrimental
future effects of China's GHG emissions. A successful fund would therefore
likely require a commitment from multiple additional Senders, who must first
overcome the collective action problem of agreeing on a fair distribution of their
respective contributions. Even then, the individual contributions that would be
required may remain too high, given the significant gap between what Targets
are asking as a reward and what Senders are likely prepared to contribute in the
end.
novice (visited Oct 21, 2011) ("E50 billion per year[ ] is less than half of what developing
countries need.'); Levi, 88 Foreign Aff at 93 (cited in note 84) (discussing China's demand for
$300 billion annually).
155 See Bill Gates, 2010 Annual Letterofmm Bill Gates *17 (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Jan 2010),
online at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/annual-letter/2010/Documents/2010-bill-gates-
annual-letter.pdf (visited Oct 21, 2011).
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D. Reversible Rewards
In Section II of this Article we demonstrated how Reversible Rewards can,
in theory, achieve the same enforcement goals as simple sanctions or simple
rewards but at a lower cost. We now turn to examine how Reversible Rewards
would, in practice, affect China's incentives to comply and American and
European incentives to pursue enforcement in the currency and climate
domains.
1. How Reversible Rewards work.
In the case of currency manipulation, Reversible Rewards would work as
follows: The US would announce that China is entitled to collect a reward if it
allows its currency to float, or to appreciate above some minimum exchange
rate, by some predetermined date. The US would also announce that if China
continued its intervention at that date, the reward would not be paid and instead
the US would pursue several (predetermined) sanctions. The money earmarked
for the reward would then be used to compensate key US stakeholders hurt by
the sanctions.
The simplest type of reward China could earn for compliance is a direct
cash transfer. But other, indirect rewards are also possible. For example, the US
could reward China by halting arms sales to Taiwan. The cost of such reward
would be the reduced sales profits to the US defense industry, and thus the
reward fund would be used to compensate this sector.
If, instead, China failed to cooperate and continued to intervene in the
currency markets, the US would initiate sanctions by, for example, imposing
duties on all Chinese goods. The US government would use the same funds
designated for the reward to cover its expenses in administering the tariff or to
pay for any litigation costs involved in defending its measures in the WTO.
Similarly, if faced with retaliation, the US could resort to these same funds to
compensate those of its industries that would become targets of Chinese trade
sanctions.
Similarly, the EU could proceed to enforce GHG reduction targets on
China unilaterally by employing Reversible Rewards. It could set aside funds for
the sole purpose of financing rewards (for example, direct cash transfers to
facilitate the transformation of China's energy infrastructure) and sanctions (for
example, carbon tariffs) the way we have discussed above in connection with the
US-China currency conflict."' The EU could allocate additional rewards in
156 The difference would be that the EU and the US would not want to use the fund to cover the
costs to their consumers and producers, who would incur higher costs in buying Chinese carbon-
intensive products because they would have faced similar higher costs in the event that China
were to comply.
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separate accounts and pursue a similar strategy towards other key Targets that
are major emitters of GHGs and that refuse to sign the treaty. Most likely, the
EU would only enforce the treaty against a few major emitters and ignore the
behavior of states whose contribution to climate change is trivial. As our analysis
showed, Reversible Rewards would require a substantially smaller contribution
to the individual accounts. Still, enforcing a global treaty unilaterally is likely to
be too costly for the EU.
The EU could lower its enforcement costs if it were able to persuade the
US and possibly other states to join the treaty and enforce the treaty against
remaining Targets as co-Senders. The participation of the US would expand the
resources available through the Reversible Rewards, further reducing the funds
the EU would need to deposit upfront. The involvement of the US could also
make trade sanctions against China more potent. Thus, the first task the EU
would face as a lead Sender is to broaden the coalition of Senders by enticing
potential co-Senders-predominantly the US-to enforce the treaty against
China."' The Leading Sender has three primary ways to gain the cooperation of
a potential co-Sender: it can buy off the co-Sender's cooperation through
rewards, coerce cooperation through a threat of sanctions, or, as our model
would suggest, seek cooperation through a combination of the two."' As a
second step, the EU and the co-Sender would jointly set up the Reversible
Reward mechanism and proceed with offering rewards or inflicting sanctions,
depending on China's record of compliance.
The US and the EU could further bolster their enforcement efforts by
placing the Reversible Rewards in an irrevocable enforcement fund. The
allocated budget would be deposited into this escrow fund for the sole purpose
of resolving the currency issue (or, alternatively, the climate change conflict)
against the specified Target-in this case, China. The enforcement fund could
not advance any other objectives and could not be used to deter any other
Target. This would make the commitment to the Reversible Reward scheme
more credible. Of course, there are no simple legal templates to achieve the
irrevocability effect in the public international arena. We will address some
possible ways to contract into this arrangement in Section IV.D.3 below.
157 For a discussion on the difficulties in gaining support of other countries for sanctions, see Martin,
45 World Pol at 408-19 (cited in note 37).
158 See id at 411-12. We do not discuss the rewards and sanctions that the EU could use towards the
US due to the analytical similarity of the situation with the discussion of the US' employing
rewards and sanctions against China.
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2. The benefits of Reversible Rewards.
The key advantage of Reversible Rewards is their ability to lower the
Sender's enforcement costs through the dual use of the same funds. We have
shown that Reversible Rewards generate additional compliance by stretching the
wedge between the Target's payoffs from compliance and non-compliance,
leading the Target to comply in circumstances where simple sanctions or simple
rewards fail to have this effect.
However, Reversible Rewards have additional benefits. They exploit the
"best of both worlds" by harnessing the advantages of rewards without forgoing
the advantages of sanctions. At the same time, they mitigate the downsides of
both. First, rewards lend legitimacy to the threat to inflict sanctions. Within the
Target, sanctions may have the effect of unifying the various groups in the face
of a common external threat to its sovereignty ("rally-round-the-flag effect").'s
Sanctioned and ostracized regimes are likely to pose a greater threat to the
Sender. Destabilizing an already erratic regime may exacerbate problems rather
than alleviate them.6 o The inclusion of a reward element mitigates these
problems."' Rewards also avoid the negative side effects that sanctions have on
cooperation with the Target on other (current or future) issues.162 Imposing
simple sanctions on China for its alleged currency manipulation, for instance,
makes it much harder for the US to convince China to cooperate with it on
disciplining Iran or North Korea. Sanctions are also often more divisive than
rewards within the Sender, particularly when sanctions are costly to domestic
industries while rewards would expand their economic opportunities. 6
Offering a reward to the Target before sanctions are triggered is also less
likely to be condemned by third parties or international organizations. Resistance
to the US' unilateral decision to inflict trade sanctions is likely to be more
restrained if the US combined its punishment strategy with first offering China
'5 See Long, 40 Intl Studies Q at 82 (cited in note 17); United States General Accounting Office,
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Economic Sanctions:
Effectiveness as Tools ofForeign Polig, GAO/NSIAD-92-106 at 4-5 (Feb 19, 1992).
160 This would be less applicable to China but relevant to North Korea or Iran. See Haass and
O'Sullivan, Introduction at 3 (cited in note 7).
161 See Long, 40 Intl Studies Q at 82 (cited in note 17) (using Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein as
examples to show how sanctions act as rallying devices that can be used to extend regimes by
oppressive leaders).
162 See Baldwin, 24 World Pol at 33 (cited in note 24) (distinguishing between "spill-over effects,"
which are harms caused by sanctions to the Sender and Target's relations while sanctions are
imposed, and "scar effects," which are harms caused by sanctions to future relations between the
parties).
163 See Long, 40 Intl Studies Q at 82 (cited in note 17).
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the opportunity to accept the reward. 164 The pursuit of a cooperative strategy
initially is also likely to facilitate later efforts to mobilize a coalition to carry out
sanctions, if required. 16
Conversely, simple rewards can be more effective and acceptable when
coupled with a threat of sanctions. Rewarding unfriendly or defiant nations can
be difficult to justify to a domestic constituency. The leadership within the
Sender may struggle to explain why a nation that fails to abide by its obligations
ought to be rewarded. The American public is not likely to be receptive to the
idea of a large wealth transfer to China-particularly given the existing fiscal
deficit-and would probably prefer the pursuit of sanctions, the costs of which
are not as immediately observable. Reducing the total amount of wealth transfer
necessary to buy China's compliance and preserving the option to inflict
sanctions is hence likely to garner greater acceptance among American
taxpayers."' A simple reward strategy can also compromise the perception of
resolve and toughness-attributes that many leaders work hard to cultivate-
and be associated with the negative connotations of appeasement. 67 Reinforcing
the promise of rewards with a credible threat of sanctions is likely to mitigate
this concern. Thus, the Reversible Rewards can please both audiences: those
who favor sanctions and those who advocate rewards.
A further benefit of Reversible Rewards is that they can mitigate, though
not eliminate, the collective action problem-a central problem underlying
cooperation on climate change. There are at least two aspects to this problem in
the context of climate change: first, countries have incentives to remain Targets
and, second, potential co-Senders can free ride on other Senders' enforcement
efforts. To the extent that Reversible Rewards provide increased deterrence, they
directly alleviate the first aspect of the collective action problem. And, to the
extent that they increase the propensity of countries to join a costly enforcement
effort, they alleviate the second aspect of the collective action problem.'
164 See Haass and O'Sullivan, Conclusion at 162 (cited in note 33).
165 See Kenneth I. Juster, The Myth of Iraqgate, 94 Foreign Poly 105, 105-09 (1994) (explaining
"Iraqgate," a popular scandal in the media about agricultural aid to Iraq before the first Gulf War,
as initial attempts by the Bush Administration to normalize relations with Iraq to avert conflict).
166 However, the public may also consider unused money held in escrow wasteful, reducing political
acceptance.
167 See Baldwin, 24 World Pol at 34 (cited in note 24); Nincic, 7 Intl Studies Perspectives at 322
(cited in note 39).
168 For instance, there is significant uncertainty as to which countries would contribute to the Climate
Fund, highlighting the collective action problem undermining any reward mechanism requiring
cooperation among multiple Senders. The EU has pledged to contribute $10.5 billion to the
2010-12 start-up fund, whereas the US has merely stated that it intends to contribute but refuses
to specify the level of its contribution. See Climate Change after Copenhagen: China's Thing about
Numbers, Economist 35 Gan 2, 2010); EU Raises Stakes with 67.2bn in Cmate Change Aid (Eur
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There are several reasons why Reversible Rewards could decrease free-
riding among Senders. First, this mechanism requires each participant to
contribute less. Second, the establishment of a fund is separate from its use.
Thus, the international community needs to address the collective action
problem only when assembling the fund, not when administering its
expenditures, as the designated Senders alone would be compensated from the
fund. Further, the problem of undetected defections from cooperation can be
easily overcome, since it is easy to monitor who has contributed to the fund.
Later, if sanctions are needed, Senders are less likely to defect because
sanctioning costs are reimbursed from the fund.
Reversible Rewards also separate rewards and sanctions for the purposes
of harnessing the broadest possible coalition of Senders. By decoupling the two
elements of the enforcement scheme-rewarding and sanctioning-the
mechanism allows different Senders to participate at different stages of the
enforcement action. Some states may choose to contribute to the payment of
the reward whereas others may volunteer to carry out the punishment, if
necessary (and be compensated from the reward funds). This way, the
enforcement burden can be allocated in the most cost-effective way. Decoupling
is also helpful as there may be states that are not in a position to pursue
sanctions, or that would face a distinctly high cost of doing so, but still share the
common goal of the Senders. For instance, states that do not import from
Target countries do not have the option of credibly threatening them with
tariffs.
Similarly, some Senders may only be able to gain domestic political
approval for rewards but not for sanctions. The EU, for instance, has often
preferred politics of positive engagement and rewards to inflicting sanctions. In
contrast, other states are less likely to obtain domestic political support for
rewards but are prepared to carry out sanctions and shoulder their burden that
way. For instance, while various domestic climate change bills pending in
Congress contain language on carbon tariffs, the US has indicated that it will not
participate in funding a relatively resourceful country like China through
rewards."' Thus, one option would be for the EU to donate more resources to
Commn Dec 11, 2010), online at http://ec.europa.eu/news/euexplained/091211_en.htm
(visited Oct 21, 2011); Support for Developing Countries under the '-latoyama Iniiative": Japan Pledges $11
Billion of Public Money for Assistance up to 2012 (Government of Japan Dec 16, 2009), online at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/topics/2009/1216initiative e.pdf (visited Oct 21, 2011); Frank
McDonald, Cinton Says US Climate Aid Conditional on Transpareng, Irish Times 12 (Dec 18, 2009).
169 See Todd Stern, Press Briefing on UN Climate Change Negotiations (Dec 9, 2009), online at
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/12/10/todd-stern-2/ (visited Oct 21, 2011) C'I don't envision
public funds-certainly not from the United States-going to China.").
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the fund while having the US take the lead in threatening China with tougher
sanctions.
Strengthening the Reversible Reward mechanism with an explicit pre-
commitment element would bring additional advantages. Like any escrow
arrangement, a precommitted Reversible Reward fund would have the benefit of
convincing the other party of the seriousness of the Sender's intent. This would
be a credible way for a government to make a commitment to a foreign
government. In the international context, there would be the additional benefit
of allowing the current government to tie the hands of a successive
administration that might not otherwise be as committed to addressing the issue.
Without an escrow arrangement, the next administration may well choose to
divert the funds for a purpose other than, for instance, the US-China currency
conflict, including national security missions, deficit reduction, or tax cuts to
individuals and corporations. Thus, the escrow mechanism would open up a
credible strategy for a long-term commitment in an uncertain political
environment.
3. Challenges of Reversible Rewards.
The first challenge for a Reversible Reward scheme is defining compliance.
This is likely to be less problematic in some instances, including the currency
manipulation context, where the value of Yuan can be objectively and cheaply
monitored.17 0 In the climate area, defining compliance requires the EU and the
US to obtain information on China's actual emission levels. Most developing
countries, including China, do not currently have the capacity to monitor their
economy-wide emissions.17 ' And even if they did, the US and the EU would be
unlikely to trust the numbers provided by China."17 This is a challenge to any
enforcement action in the climate area, not unique to Reversible Rewards. If it is
insurmountable, the implications extend beyond the feasibility of this
mechanism. If, instead, monitoring is possible, then part of the enforcement
mechanism's fixed costs would need to be directed to monitoring, reporting, and
verifying the emissions in order to determine whether the country is meeting its
target and whether it therefore remains entitled to the reward.17 1
170 In these other cases, part of the reward fund's fixed costs would need to be directed to
monitoring China's activities in order to determine whether it is meeting its obligations and
whether it therefore remains entitled to the reward.
171 See Levi, 88 Foreign Aff at 95 (cited in note 84).
172 See Jim Tankersley, Enforcing Pledges is an Obstacle at Climate Talks; A Monitoring Dispute Pits the West
against Emerging Powers, LA Times A37 (Dec 11, 2009).
173 Note that the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system designed to support the
system of rewards differs from the MRV costs that the US would incur in administering a carbon
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While the difficulty of determining whether the Target has complied
applies to all enforcement actions, a challenge that is unique to Reversible
Rewards stems from the need to determine when to reverse the reward to the
Sender. It is feasible that the US or the EU may be motivated by the opportunity
to collect a reward in situations where punishment is not welfare-enhancing.
They may also seek to attain the reward but not use it to carry out punishment.
This would, obviously, dilute the entire "double leverage" mechanism that
makes Reversible Rewards attractive in the first place. Finally, Senders might
have an incentive to find non-compliance if they believe that the prospective
reimbursement from the fund outweighs their actual costs of sanctioning. Thus,
it may be necessary to monitor not only the conduct of the Target but that of
each Sender in order to guarantee the effectiveness of Reversible Rewards.
A further challenge of Reversible Rewards relates to a potential moral
hazard problem. In utilizing Reversible Rewards, the US would need to avoid
setting a precedent that all international cooperation entitles countries to a
reward. Such a signal could lead to a highly problematic "race to be a Target."
While no country wants to have sanctions imposed on it, many countries would
be eager to be Targets of an enforcement action based on rewards. The US'
offer to reward China for discontinuing its condemned behavior could thus
signal to other countries that any country that threatens to act contrary to its
international obligations can collect a reward, removing the idea that "good
behavior" ought to be automatic and unconditional in the international
community. Alternatively, existing Targets might amplify their objectionable
behavior (for example, China could further lower the value of its currency) in an
effort to ratchet up the magnitude of the reward that the US would offer for
their compliance.
Of course, moral hazard problem undermines all enforcement actions that
contain element of rewards and is not limited to Reversible Rewards. Indeed,
one might suggest that the problem is less severe in the case of Reversible
Rewards than simple rewards because of the smaller amount that the frivolous
Target can expect to capture as a reward. Moral hazard incentives underlying
Reversible Rewards may also be mitigated compared to the situation of using
simple rewards, as the Target identifying itself as an entity eligible for a reward
also simultaneously identifies itself as a potential Target of sanctions. Still, the
existence of the moral hazard problem supports our argument that Reversible
Rewards are better suited to strategic settings where the recipient of the reward
can be ex ante limited to a unique Target in connection with a specific
enforcement conflict.
tariff in that the rewards would most likely require information on countries' total emissions as
opposed to emissions that can be attached to each individual product that crosses the US border.
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The moral hazard problem looms particularly severe when Senders attempt
to solve a global collective action problem akin to climate change, where every
country seeks to free ride on other states' efforts to curtail emissions. Any
reward mechanism could attract numerous frivolous Targets that all seek to
present themselves as potential Targets in the hope of collecting the reward.
Alternatively, genuine Targets like China might raise their GHG emission levels
in an effort to drive up the magnitude of the reward that the Sender would offer
for their compliance. Thus, Reversible Rewards require the Senders to convert
generic enforcement problems (involving multiple Targets seeking to extract
rewards) into unique enforcement problems that focus on changing the behavior
of one or a limited number of Targets that cannot be deterred through simple
sanctions.
To address this concern, the EU and the US could explicitly limit the
Reversible Rewards to genuine Targets. These would be states that stand to be
net losers under the climate treaty or states that are economically dependent on
outside funding to comply with the treaty. Importantly, the category of genuine
Targets would not include states that can be deterred by sanctions alone. Also
excluded would be states that are net beneficiaries from climate treaties and that
can afford to make the technological changes required to meet the stipulated
emissions goals, because their threats to continue with violations are not
credible. These conditions would limit the beneficiaries of Reversible Rewards to
large Target countries that are difficult or impossible to deter through sanctions
alone. The coalition of Senders could, for instance, limit the offer of Reversible
Rewards to China, and, possibly, utilize them in a separate enforcement action
against India.
Placing the funds in an irrevocable fund, as suggested above, would present
its own set of challenges. The utilization of an escrow arrangement raises the
obvious question of how the fund holding these rewards could be truly sunk. If
the money is not sunk-if it can be reclaimed for a different purpose by the
Sender-then the cost of sanctioning is no longer zero, which would undermine
the credibility of the threat to inflict sanctions. Ideally, the Senders would try to
credibly tie their hands by surrendering their control of the escrow fund and
designating a neutral third party to manage the funds as a trustee.
Escrow arrangements have been used in international law in instances
where sovereign states do not trust each other and require additional safeguards
to reinforce commitments they make to one another. For example, the Libyan
government used the Bank for International Settlements when it established an
escrow arrangement to compensate the families of the Pan Am Flight 103
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victims.174 Similarly, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, which was set up to provide a
negotiated solution to the Iran hostage crisis following Iran's Islamic Revolution,
relied on an escrow mechanism when the US undertook to unfreeze Iranian
assets in return for Iran releasing the hostages. 71
In these cases, a private bank in a neutral country was used as an escrow
agent. The choice of an escrow agent would be crucial in conferring the required
credibility for the arrangement. For the US and EU's offer to reward China to be
credible, China would need to trust the escrow agent to release the funds when
their compliance is verified. And for the sanction threat to be credible, the
escrow agent would have to be one over which the Senders have no leverage.
For these reasons, international organizations like the UN, the World Bank, or
the IMF might not work; China would most likely distrust a fund managed by
these bodies over which the US and the EU wield significant power."'6 By
choosing an autonomous third party, the US and the EU can send a strong
signal of their commitment to reward-and, if necessary, to sanction China.
The difficulty in choosing a neutral third party to manage the Reversible
Rewards scheme arises from the joint tasks the escrow institution would have to
perform. On one hand, the institution would have to make difficult judgments in
evaluating whether the Target has complied or whether the Sender has followed
through with sanctions. For this to succeed, this body would have to be an
established international institution-including, for instance, a UN Sanctions
Committee-with the competence and experience to make these subtle
judgments on compliance. At the same time, such institutions are often closely
related to, and influenced by, the US and the EU. This would raise questions as
to their capability to perform their other task, which is to direct the money only
174 See Jonathan B. Schwartz, Dealing with a 'Rogue State": The Lilya Precedent, 101 Am J Intl L 553, 570
(2007).
s75 Iran had seized 53 Americans from the US embassy in Teheran and held them hostage for 444
days from 1979 to 1981. The US responded by freezing all Iranian assets in the US. The two
countries established an escrow arrangement whereby the Banque Centrale d'Algerie in the Bank
of England held the frozen Iranian assets that the US had agreed to transfer to Iran in return for
the release of the hostages. When the aircraft carrying the hostages left Iran, the Banque Centrale
d'Algerie released the agreed amount of the funds to Iran. See Official Documents: Settlement of the
Iran Hostage Crisis, 75 Am J Intl L 418, 427 (1981).
176 Contrast this to the discussion of how the Copenhagen Climate Fund would be managed. Some
have proposed placing the fund under the umbrella of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)
with the World Bank as a Trustee. Developing countries, however, have expressed skepticism of a
fund that is administered by the GEF, preferring to avoid a close involvement by the World Bank
and a tight control of the funds by the donor countries. The GEF is also criticized for the high
fees involved in its administration. See Nathanial Gronewold, Red Tape, High Fees Hamstring Int'l
Green Funds, NY Times (Dec 22, 2009), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/12/22/22greenvire-red-tape-high-fees-hamstring-int-
green-funds-3156.html?pagewanted=2 (visited Oct 21, 2011).
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to the pre-committed purposes and withstand any ex post pressures from the
funding countries.
One option would be to use an independent arbitration panel, nominated
by the Sender and the Target jointly, to determine whether the Target is entitled
to a reward for compliance or whether the Sender is entitled to recompense for
imposing sanctions on a non-complying Target. The panel's decisionmaking
could be guided not only by the specific escrow provisions, but also by the laws
and guidelines of the relevant international institutions (for example, IMF and
WTO provisions on currency manipulation or any agreed-upon international
climate change treaty). This arbitration panel would then instruct the actual
trustee of the escrow institution as to whether and when to release the funds.
Given the challenges embedded in using a formal third party escrow, the
Sender may choose to resort to indirect and less formal commitment
mechanisms whenever these mechanisms are sufficient to provide the needed
credibility. The Sender may simply dedicate a set of funds for a specific
enforcement challenge and make a highly publicized statement on how the funds
are to be used. If the Sender were to renege on its promise to extend a reward to
the complying Target or fail to proceed with sanctions against a non-complying
Target, the Sender would lose its credibility with the current Target as well as
with all other future targets. In other words, inaction by the Sender would
constitute a visible signal to other potential Targets that its promise of rewards
or a threat of sanctions is empty. This alone would likely keep the Sender from
compromising its own enforcement scheme, albeit less formally than if a formal
escrow arrangement was used.
Finally, we acknowledge that the challenge with Reversible Rewards-
irrespective of the costs-is the dwindling leverage the US or the EU have to
"hold the entire bilateral relationship hostage" to a single concern such as
currency manipulation or climate change. Senders cannot afford to jettison
cooperation with China on a host of key areas based on insistence that progress
be made in one isolated area.17 ' Because China knows this, any effective threats
and conditional rewards to China are difficult to devise and implement. But this
challenge, too, is not unique to Reversible Rewards. Thus, any incentive or
coercive strategy is likely to be more complicated than what any enforcement
mechanism can capture-even if we manage to enhance credibility and lower
the costs of such a strategy through Reversible Rewards."17
177 See Haass and O'Sullivan, Conclusion at 177 (cited in note 33).
178 Even a qualified success of enforcement would present a victory in the existing conflict with
China. Even if China stopped short of letting its currency float, the US would benefit from
China's measures to allow its currency to appreciate.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE PATH FOR BROADER APPLICATIONS
Although the choice between sticks and carrots is a fundamental and
much-discussed dilemma in international law, the existing literature has failed to
recognize that the combined use of both sticks and carrots could improve
compliance without burdening the fiscal position of the Sender. Backing up
rewards with the threat of sanctions-or complementing a threat of sanctions
with the promise of a reward-creates a more potent enforcement measure in
an area long plagued by weak enforcement.
So why do we not see Reversible Rewards being used in practice? First, as
we noted, their application is limited. Reversible Rewards are not designed to
solve every enforcement problem. In situations where sanctions are not costly, a
Sender can credibly deter a Target at little or no cost. A threat of sanctions that
does not need to be carried out is always superior to a simple reward or to a
Reversible Reward, both of which force the Sender to incur some costs if the
Target complies. The advantage of Reversible Rewards is therefore limited to
situations where the Sender's threat suffers from lack of credibility due to high
enforcement costs. Second, Reversible Rewards are also better suited to solve
specific violations by individual Targets, as opposed to generic violations by
multiple Targets; to contain the moral hazard problem; and to limit the total
funds that the Sender needs to dispatch.
Further, some problems that apply to simple rewards or simple sanctions
also carry over to Reversible Rewards. At times, sanctions are not available to
the Sender. Consider the enforcement problems currently underlying the
Eurozone. When countries like Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are already on the
verge (or in the midst) of financial ruin, tougher sanctions would make them less
likely to recover. This would only worsen the position of Senders. Sanctions are
similarly ineffective in situations where the Sender has already employed them
unsuccessfully against a Target in the past and where further sanctions can only
inflict marginal additional pain on the Target. For instance, the US' extensive
sanctions have not changed policies in countries like North Korea or Syria."9
Imposing additional sanctions would have, at best, trivial adverse effects on
these countries. In these scenarios, when sanctions are not feasible or useful,
Reversible Rewards are not helpful. In such situations, the promise of lifting
existing sanctions is often the most attractive reward for the Target. This type of
reward, however, is not costly to the Sender and thus not an enforcement action
that benefits from the use of Reversible Rewards.
Other times, rewards are not feasible, undermining the dual leverage of
Reversible Rewards. When an egregious regime engages in genocide or commits
179 See David E. Sanger, U.S. Faces a Challenge in Tging to Punish Syria, NY Times A10 (Apr 26, 2011).
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crimes against humanity, few would suggest that the international community
ought to offer lucrative trade deals or other rewards to persuade the regime to
stop slaughtering its citizens. There is a point in a conflict after which rewards
are no longer an option and the international community faces a choice between
inaction and sanctions. For instance, after the UN Security Council authorized a
military intervention in Libya in March 2011 to protect civilians from assaults
conducted by Muammar Gaddafi's forces, a strategy of rewards was foreclosed.
At best, a "reward" to the Libyan leadership post-intervention would have
consisted of a promise to withdraw NATO forces in exchange for a credible
promise of an immediate termination of all attacks against civilians. Again, this
type of reward removes an existing cost-the military operation-rather than
imposing a new one on the coalition of Senders and does not therefore call for
Reversible Rewards.
Despite these limitations, Reversible Rewards can be valuable in various
settings where the costs and credibility of enforcement are central impediments
for the deployment of either sanctions or rewards. In addition to international
economic and environmental issues discussed above, Reversible Rewards could
be useful in enforcing national security-related norms. For instance, the US and
the EU have in the past offered multiple rounds of rewards and sanctions in
trying to halt Iran's nuclear ambitions.so Thus far, this dual-track approach has
not persuaded Iran to give up its nuclear program. The sanctions have further
imposed significant costs on the US and the EU while ceding economic
opportunities to countries that continue to engage with Iran, such as China and
Russia.'"' Instead of absorbing the high sanctioning costs associated with
maintaining largely ineffective sanctions, an alternative strategy for the US and
the EU would have been to employ the dual incentives offered by Reversible
Rewards at the outset. For instance, in exchange for abandoning its nuclear
program, the US and its allies could have offered to invest in the Iranian energy
infrastructure or pay for gasoline deliveries to Iran from a Reversible Reward
fund. Should Iran have turned down such a reward, the fund could have been
used to finance the costs of sanctions-including a nearly complete trade
embargo and a set of financial sanctions and asset-freezes targeting Iranian
companies and individuals.
1so See Daniel Dombey, US and EU Step Up Iran Nuclear Sanctions Drive, Fin Times 6 (May 25, 2011);
Daniel Dombey, EU Renews Offer of Nuclear Aid to Tebran (Fin Times May 15, 2006), online at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1315b82e-e430-1 lda-8ced-
0000779e2340.html#axzzlP8392XsB (visited Oct 21, 2011).
181 See Ali Sheikholeslami, Anthony DiPaola, and Alaric Nightingale, Iran Saneions Leave China, Russia
as Winners in Trade, Bloomberg (Aug 8, 2010), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
08-08/china-embracing-iran-raises-reliance-ship-costs-as-un-sanctions-take-toll.html (visited Oct
21, 2011).
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We could further imagine Israel using this mechanism in its conflicts with
Hamas or the Palestinian Authority. Whether it is Israel's attempts to free a
kidnapped soldier or to induce the Palestinians to adopt some security-related
measure, Israel could offer a set of incentives through Reversible Rewards. It
could extend direct financial aid or promise to build much-needed infrastructure,
such as schools and hospitals in the Palestinian territory, or agree to withdraw
some of its settlements in the West Bank. These rewards could be financed from
a Reversible Reward fund that would be set up for the sole purpose of inducing
the Palestinian side to comply. If the reward is rejected, the trustee of the fund
would transfer the funds to the Israeli military for the purpose of, say, building
more settlements. Knowing that Israel can retaliate at a lower cost, the
Palestinian side is more likely to accept the reward in the first place. Israel is also
likely to trigger less international condemnation for its action if it results from
the Palestinians' decision first to reject a set of positive inducements. Finally,
having an independent trustee deploy the funds is likely to provide the needed
level of trust in a conflict otherwise marked by considerable distrust between the
parties.
The idea of decoupling-where one Sender extends the reward and
another Sender carries out the sanctions-was discussed above in connection
with climate policy. Dividing the rewarding and sanctioning functions between
different entities could also be helpful in a variety of other enforcement settings.
For instance, to contain the terrorist threat posed by groups like Hamas, the US
could offer rewards-such as direct cash transfers-in return for these groups
forfeiting their arms. This reward could be backed up by an explicit threat of
sanctions carried out by another party. For instance, Israel could threaten to
punish Hamas by force. The threat would be made credible by a promise to
finance the strike from the Reversible Reward fund set up by the US. Even
international organizations could decouple sanctions and rewards to gain more
leverage and save costs through Reversible Rewards. To halt Iran and North
Korea's nuclear ambitions, for instance, the World Bank could offer a reward-
investment in these countries' energy infrastructure-and the UN could impose
the threat of sanctions-primarily economic, but backed by a military threat-
that would be financed from the World Bank's fund if Iran and North Korea
rejected their rewards.
Also, while relying on Reversible Rewards to Euro members that are
already on the brink of a sovereign default would be difficult, strengthening the
Eurozone governance with Reversible Rewards in the future is worth
considering. European countries have agreed to pre-commit 700 billion euros in
the new European Stability Mechanism (ESM)-European governments'
proposed central lending facility. The ESM will likely allow for sanctions to be
inflicted against governments that break agreed-upon fiscal rules on budget
deficit and public debt. Pre-committed funds are meant to secure the AAA
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credit rating for the lending facility and send a clear signal to the markets that the
ESM will have the capacity to solve any future crises in the currency area.182 Yet
a further advantage of the pre-commitment mechanism could be its ability to
sustain the Reversible Rewards mechanism. The pre-committed capital could be
used to extend rewards (for example, loans) to countries with sound fiscal
policies and sanctions to countries that fail to follow the fiscal discipline (for
example, loans on a "penalty" interest rate, austerity measures, fines and,
ultimately, a forced exit from the currency union). These fines could further be
used to bolster the ESM's resources, making reckless countries supply more of
the required capital for the joint facility. This would create additional incentives
for the Eurozone members to abide by the currency union's rules without
increasing the resources of the ESM.
Applying Reversible Rewards in the context of a highly institutionalized
supranational system like the EU would also likely mitigate the concerns about
designing a credible escrow that would have the capability to monitor
compliance and execute the payment of rewards. The EU and the Eurozone
benefit from existing institutions with the power to exercise supranational
authority and extensive experience in solving disputes between member states.
The member states could vest the European Court of Justice with the powers to
act as the final arbitrator. Alternatively, this power could be given to the
Governing Council of the European Central Bank, which is formally
independent of the member states' influence. Some recent proposals include
establishing new governance institutions for the Eurozone, including a
European Finance Ministry or a "Stability Council." These institutions could be
natural arbitrators of compliance with the new fiscal rules. This type of
economic governance would represent a significant strengthening of the current
system under which fines have never been imposed against an EU member state.
A different question is whether these steps towards a fiscal union will ever be
taken. Yet, if the economic governance rules for the Eurozone are being re-
written, it merits discussing whether sanctions, rewards, or a combination of the
two will provide the best enforcement strategy for a strong and stable currency
union.
The idea that sanctions are superior instruments of enforcement is deeply
entrenched in scholarly and public discourse. Yet the inability to credibly
commit to sanctioning is pervasive and continues to undermine much of
international enforcement. These limits of simple sanctions have provided the
motivation for our inquiry. The above examples show that Reversible Rewards
have the potential to furnish incentives for a Target to comply with a Sender's
182 See Tony Barber, Four Steps to Fiscal Union, Fin Times 5 (Aug 12, 2011); see also Council
Conclusion, 1 EUCO 10/1/11 REV I at 23-25 (Mar 24-25, 2011).
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demands in situations where the cost of sanctioning would otherwise dilute the
credibility of the Sender's threat. Reversible Rewards will not replace simple
sanctions in the enforcement of international law. Yet they offer a novel way to
think about compliance and credibility through a framework that takes
stakeholders' incentives and the costs of enforcement seriously.
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